This perspective seeks to explain our apparent commitment to possible worlds in a manner akin to our engagement with other fictional constructs, such as ideal gases or frictionless surfaces.
For example, statements like "There is a (non-actual) possible world at which there are blue swans" are understood through an analogy with "There is a brilliant detective at 221b Baker Street," as proposed by Rosen.
Similarly, when a coin flip results in heads, there is no outcome in which it lands tails, strictly speaking.
This approach is particularly appealing when considering merely possible objects, such as blue swans or dragons, which are often characterized by their non-actual existence.
[2] In conclusion, modal fictionalism offers a unique perspective on the nature of possible worlds, allowing for the exploration of these concepts while avoiding the ontological commitment to their actual existence.
The diversity of approaches within modal fictionalism highlights the rich philosophical discussions and debates surrounding this intriguing viewpoint.
These concerns are not uniformly applicable to all forms of modal fictionalism and often target specific versions of the doctrine.
Fictional stories are human creations, typically authored by individuals who exercise a significant degree of control over the content and truth within those narratives.
This concern is particularly relevant when modal truth is thought to depend on the contents of the fiction, as the possibility of blue swans, for instance, should not be contingent upon whether stories have been told.
For example, the Sherlock Holmes stories do not specify the exact population of India or the number of hairs on Dr. Watson's head.
Different solutions have been proposed, including treating modal claims as indeterminate when the fiction is silent on corresponding questions about possible worlds.
Whether it should be considered a primitive or analyzed further remains a matter of debate and is a concern for those seeking a reductive analysis of modality.
John Divers, in particular, has raised objections to this aspect of modal fictionalism, questioning whether it can fully capture the advantages of traditional possible worlds semantics.