Operation Brother Sam
With the deterioration in relations with João Goulart's government and the favorable attitude of the groups conspiring against him, the idea of an operation to ensure the success of an uprising arose.
The issue was discussed between the U.S. ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, and officials in Washington throughout the administration of president John F. Kennedy and his successor Lyndon B. Johnson.
They thought about logistical support, the positioning of a squadron on the Brazilian coast to "show the flag" and even, in an extreme situation, a plan for a gigantic land operation, which was not used.
The operation was planned by maintaining contact with Brazilian conspirators such as general Castelo Branco, and had as an assumption the formation of a provisional government that would request foreign aid.
With the outbreak of the coup d'état, the operation was activated to transfer fuel such as gasoline by sea to the insurgent military, to leave a squadron near Brazil, and to take war supplies by air.
[15] The second was: Overt, organized resistance by sizable democratic forces, with considerable military support, against Goulart effort to seize authoritarian power.
[18][17] By mid-March 1964, the Embassy reported on the worsening political crisis, the unity of military conspirators under the figure of general Castelo Branco, who could lead a coup d'état, and the adhesion of State governors to the conspiracy.
[24][25] Lincoln Gordon had to face opposition from his superiors to get his ideas across,[24][26] standing out as the central figure in the entire effort to support Brazilian military conspirators.
Gordon had already registered on Brazil's internal defense plan,[c] dated March 20, how Brazilian security forces were poorly equipped.
[28] The December 1963 contingency plan set a condition for logistical support: If a significant part of the national territory were held by the democratic forces, formation of an alternative provisional government to request help would be highly desirable.
[29] Similarly, at the time of the coup the State Department specified that fuel and ammunition supplies could come only after "the point at which some group having a reasonable claim to legitimacy is able to formally request recognition and assistance from us and if possible from other American republics.
[31][29] Magalhães Pinto, governor of Minas Gerais, threw his state into rebellion in conjunction with the local Army garrison at the beginning of the coup d'état.
[34] According to him, Magalhães first extended this invitation in November 1963, when he mentioned the possibility of a prolonged resistance from Minas Gerais; his actions would allow, for example, the purchase of weapons abroad.
Well, it was gonna take six divisions, I’ve forgotten how many ships and aircraft and whatnot, I mean, it was a really massive military operation.
"[42][43] According to Carlos Fico [pt], the delivery of supplies to Brazilian ports would still require a small land presence, and in the case of an internal conflict in Brazil it would be possible to find some external communist interference as a pretext for military intervention.
[44] Jacob Gorender [pt] noted that the ships were not carrying land contingents, and the growing involvement in Vietnam would make a second front in Brazil difficult.
On March 28, Gordon recorded how logistical concerns were coming from the conspirators and would be specified the following week through contact between general Cintra and military attaché Vernon Walters.
[28] In Marco Antonio Villa's interpretation, the operation could have in mind the Castelista coup scheduled for the first half of April, which would allow the ships to be already close to Brazil at the moment of deflagration.
[49] In the early morning hours of the 31st, general Olímpio Mourão Filho, commander of the Brazilian Army in Minas Gerais, precipitated the coup d'état, over the heads of Castelo Branco and the other conspirators in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.
[58] For airlift, 250 12 gauge shotguns would be transferred to Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico at 03:00 (Rio de Janeiro time) on the 1st.
Telegram from the State Department to the Embassy on March 31 determined that if conditions for shipment existed, it would take 24 to 36 hours and would be destined for Campinas.
[64] On the 1st of April, senior officials in Washington, concerned about the possibility of open support for the rebellion benefiting Goulart, asked the Embassy whether "the momentum would continue on the anti-Goulart side without covert or overt encouragement from us."
He added that Ademar de Barros, governor of São Paulo, and others from his state had requested fuel and an overt naval presence, but they were not important.
At 16:30 (Rio time) on the 3rd, it was determined that "the current situation in Brazil will not require the presence of the Task Force with aircraft carriers in ocean waters to the south of the country",[66] as suggested by Gordon in the middle of the previous day.
[68] On the 3rd, Dean Rusk informed Gordon that with the operation's deactivation, costs of $2.3 million for the tankers would not be covered by the budget and might have to be reimbursed by Brazil, but this did not occur.
Four years later, during an interview by Carlos Lacerda on the television program Firing Line, a sailor in the audience stated that at the time his ship was ordered to follow to Brazil.
Journalist Marcos Sá Corrêa [pt] also examined the documents and published articles in Jornal do Brasil, which were later included in the book 1964 visto e comentado pela Casa Branca ("1964 seen and commented by the White House").
[73][74] On the 40th and 50th anniversaries of the coup in 2004 and 2014, the National Security Archive published additional records on the operation itself and American policy on Brazil in the previous two years.
