Graziosi stated that his approach thus aligns more with older interpretations and neglects the true scope and systematic nature of the terror that victimized primarily ordinary people and specific ethnic groups.

Hardy highlights the complexities of categorizing Stalin's victims, particularly the kulaks, who he believes were defined more by their perceived opposition to the regime than any inherent shared identity.

Furthermore, Hardy questions Naimark's decision to limit the designation of genocide to specific subgroups within the Soviet peasantry, rather than recognizing the widespread suffering as a whole.

[8] Michael Ellman takes the most critical view of the book: "The liberal interpretation of genocide that Naimark favors is... in line with recent jurisprudence.

Szporluk argues that Stalin's regime, with its widespread violence and purges, exemplifies this alternative outcome of class conflict, highlighting the destructive potential inherent in Marxist theory.

Throughout, Naimark argues that Stalin was far more amenable to a settlement with the Western Allies than previously thought and did not initially have a plan to build the cohesive Eastern Bloc of Soviet satellite states within Europe.

[9] [10] He also states that, while Stalin imposed his will in some countries like Poland and East Germany, he surprisingly favored restraint and accommodation in others like Denmark, Finland, and Austria.

Stalin's ultimate goal remained a Europe susceptible to Soviet influence, showcasing a leader navigating a delicate balance between dominance and diplomacy.