[4] In the early hours of 2 April 1982, in the wake of violent anti-government riots in Buenos Aires, the military junta, which ruled Argentina, launched an invasion of the Falkland Islands.
The Argentinian captain Barry Melbourne Hussey, who was chosen for a position in the administration due to his knowledge and experience of English, asserted safety as a major concern, during discussions with the Falkland Islanders: "Which would you prefer, that our eighteen-year-old conscripts, with their big lorries, should try to drive on the left, or that you, with your little vehicles, change to the right?".
[10] The restrictions imposed by the military government became steadily worse – identification papers, curfews, compulsory blackouts, confiscation of radios and cameras, requisitioning of Land-Rover 4x4 vehicles and soldiers breaking into abandoned houses to steal furniture to use as firewood.
[11] According to Port Stanley resident John Pole Evans, Argentine Air Force Pucarás conducted napalm bombings on 21 April near Stanley as a show of force that coincided with General Cristino Nicolaides's[12] visit as commander of the Argentine Army's 1st Corps that included the 10th Infantry dug around the Falklands capital: "We knew what sort of damage they could do, because during April whilst we were still in our homes, they'd bombed the Tussac Island in the harbour with napalm and it burned for a couple of days.
The bombing led to the Argentines authorities and local civilians organising civil defence in the Falklands capital and several robust houses were designated Defensa Aerea Pasiva (Air Raid Shelters).
[20] According to Brook Hardcastle, the general manager of the Falkland Island Company (FIC) based at Goose Green:After the first week the Argentines let two women go out each day to the galley in the cookhouse, where all the men would normally eat together.
"[24] The medical officer in the book Partes de Guerra (Graciela Speranza, Fernando Cittadini, p. 42, Editorial Norma, 1997) also describes how the infrastructures of Goose Geen broke under the strain of accommodating nearly 1,000 soldiers and local civilians and the British air attacks and naval bombardments that followed.
On 21 May, the Argentine command in Port Stanley sent out a civil affairs team, under Colonel Horacio Chimeno and Captain Esteban Eduardo Rallo[25] to discuss the safety of civilians and to build shelters.
"[22] During the meeting with Vicecomodoro Wilson Rosier Pedrozo in attendance, it was agreed that air force personnel, that were largely inactive after the Pucara ground-attack aircraft had been withdrawn elsewhere, should form a military police unit to protect the local houses from vandalism after complaints had reached Monsignor Daniel Spraggon in the Falklands capital that the soldiers had started to smash furniture in order to apparently keep warm at night.
[30] Bill Etheridge was the Postmaster and continued to operate with his staff under the supervision of Everto Hugo Caballero of the La Empresa Nacional de Correos y Telégrafos (ENCOTEL, National Post Office & Telecommunications Company).
[31]Major Roberto Eduardo Berazay, the officer commanding the 181st Military Police Company, would claim that his unit would win the trust of the Port Stanley residents fleeing to the countryside: "In order to prevent break-in-and-enter crimes, the local residents would repeatedly go to the Police Station to request that personnel from 181 MP Coy enter and occupy their homes during their period of absence, for which they would hand over the keys to their properties, which shows the level of trust won among the local population.
[35] Berazay would also claim in Compañía Policía Militar 181: Síntesis de su participación en Malvinas (La Gaceta Malvinense, 2003) that no more than 10 civilian houses were broken into in Port Stanley thanks to the efforts of his men.
We had good views from the windows of the house and people would rush from one room to another to watch incoming Argentine aircraft being pursued by missiles and shot down, especially prior to the SAS attack.
[38] Comodoro Carlos Bloomer-Reeve, chief of the Secretariat of the new occupation forces,[39] in conjunction with Navy Captain Barry Melbourne Hussey and Monsignor Daniel Spraggon were instrumental in avoiding conflict with the Argentine military.
[34] Jim Fairfield recalls his first encounter with Bloomer-Reeve after he and other Port Stanley residents went to see him in order to obtain monetary compensation for damages and missing items in their homes: I went back to the house one day and the tin had been ripped off the door.
[41] In an interview with Michael Bilton and Peter Kosminsky for their documentary The Falklands War: The Untold Story (1987), retired Brigadier-General Mario Benjamin Menéndez would tell both British journalists, "There was intense patrolling by our military police and a very strict discipline to ensure that soldiers could not move individually around Puerto Argentino.
[44] However, in the last day of battle, Private Santiago Carrizo of the 3rd Regiment described how a platoon commander ordered them to take up positions in the houses and "if a Kelper resists, shoot him", though the entire company did nothing of the kind.
[47] On 28 May, Darwin and Goose Green were liberated, and the attacking 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment (2 PARA) forced the surrender of some 1,000 of the Argentine defenders and released the local inhabitants unharmed.
[48]By the time they surrendered, the Argentine soldiers were already suffering from malnutrition, exposure, trench foot and diarrhea, brought on by lack of proper food and clean water.
[50] In the documentary The Islanders War (Mike Ford, 2007) Andrea Clausen recalls as a child having to hide under floorboards in the social hall during the terrifying softening-up bombardment on the part of the Royal Navy that took place during nine nights in a row.
We welcomed Graham Heaton, John Ross, Ian McKay, Stewart McLaughlin and Mack Cox into our home, and as my wife, Jan, prepared the starving Paras a meal, they brought us up to date with the developments around us.
[55] The four conscripts involved, Privates Carlos Alberto Hornos, Pedro Vojkovic, Alejandro Vargas and Manuel Zelarayán were killed when their heavily laden wooden boat struck an anti-tank mine on the opposite bank.
Snowflakes were gently falling; the roads were icy and it was bitterly cold as thousands of young Argentine soldiers abandoned the mountains, ridges, hills and valleys which they had occupied for the preceding 73 days, and walked disconsolately and dispiritedly into Stanley, resigned to their defeat and looking for shelter, warmth and food.
[36] It was in deserted sheds, bungalows and even Stanley Racecourse where the British units sought shelter with Captain John Burgess recalling the exhausted state of 3 PARA: The city was a mess, with no sewerage, water or electricity.
[57]Local fireman Lewis Clifton describes how the infrastructures of Port Stanley broke under the strain of accommodating and processing thousands of cold, weary, hungry British soldiers and Argentine prisoners of war: "The place just couldn't take it.
He lost the war but left us ill."[58] Water was scarce, since Port Stanley's main pumping station had been damaged by British naval gunfire during the final battles, with many Argentine soldiers suffering from diarrhea because of Liver Fluke Disease (found in sheep and contaminated water), forced to relieve themselves in bathtubs in commandeered homes, public showers, the dockyard, and even the desk drawers of Stanley Post Office[59] in the face of sudden violent bowel movement and with toilets no longer working.
Claims that the Argentine soldiers had behaved like savages throughout the occupation were investigated with British war correspondents Patrick Joseph Bishop and John Witherow writing:They had certainly been responsible for smashing up the solid old post office, and the backstreets of the town were littered with excrement.
Said a worried Rear-Admiral John Woodward: "They are already suffering from malnutrition, exposure, trench foot, scabies and diarrhea, brought on by lack of food and pure water, proper clothing, shelter and sanitation.
The first prisoners of war to board the ships were the officers and men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment of the 10th Brigade who were told to dump all their gear, packs, sleeping bags, ponchos and food items on the street leading them to dockyard, much to the fury of the brigade commander, Brigadier-General Oscar Luis Jofre, "At the beginning of the march, the unfortunate scene took place of Argentine equipment being dumped all along the street that led to the dock, a route that had been crossed by the already mentioned 3rd Mech Inf Rgt.
[67]British journalist Andrew Vine from the Yorkshire Post aboard the Canberra compared the worn-out state of the young Argentine soldiers captured at Port Stanley with those seized earlier at Goose Green, noting the demeanour of the marine conscripts and those belonging in army units that had received commando-type training: These prisoners were in an even more pitiful state than those taken aboard at San Carlos, gaunt, hollow-cheeked and starving.