Pugilist established an alternative route of attack and Operation Supercharge II, an outflanking manoeuvre via the Tebaga Gap was planned.

Montgomery reinforced the flanking attack, which from 26 to 31 March, forced the 1st Army to retreat to Wadi Akarit, another 40 mi (64 km) back in Tunisia.

[a] On 8 November, Operation Torch began in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, as the Panzeramee Afrika in Egypt managed to evade British outflanking moves but traffic jams, fuel shortages, poor weather and air attacks reduced the speed of their retreat to 6–7 mi (9.7–11.3 km) per day.

[2] Rommel wanted to retreat to Wadi Akarit in the Gabès area, 120 mi (190 km) further west, where the non-motorised troops could defend a narrow gap between the Mediterranean and the Chott Djerid.

On the night of 11/12 December, the British attacked and on the following evening, the Panzerarmee resumed its retreat, and despite its chronic fuel shortage, evaded another outflanking move.

The Panzerarmee took up a defensive position at Buerat on 29 December but it was poorly fortified, wide open to an outflanking manoeuvre and vulnerable to an attack on Gabès by the First Army in southern Tunisia.

Comando Supremo intended them to hold the line indefinitely but Rommel considered it too vulnerable to another flanking move, unlike the Wadi Akarit position further back.

[4] The broken terrain of southern Tunisia, with difficult rocky ridge lines and desert, limited manoeuvre; opposite the bight where the north–south coast opens to the east, a semi-arid, scrub covered coastal plain is met inland by the Matmata Hills which lie south to north.

In 1938, the French judged Jebel Dahar impassable for motorised transport, and so had not extended the Mareth Line any further inland, but in 1943, motor vehicles had much better performance.

The British had an advantage because General Georges Catroux, the designer and garrison commander of the Mareth Line in the 1930s, was available in Algiers, to provide information and advice for the attack.

[7] In the original plan, Montgomery wrote "...the object of Operation Pugilist is to destroy the enemy now opposing Eighth Army in the Mareth Line and to advance and capture Sfax".

Forewarned by Ultra decrypts of German wireless communications, the British rushed reinforcements from Tripoli and Benghazi before the Axis attack, which was a costly failure.

General Erwin Rommel, the commander of Army Group Africa (Heeresgruppe Afrika), could not afford to lose men he needed to defend the Mareth Line, abandoned the effort at dusk.

During the day the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica had made a maximum effort with little effect against the Allied anti-aircraft defence and the Desert Air Force.

Spitfires would escort the bombers and fighter-bombers and the remainder of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF) would bomb Axis airfields.

Despite the slow advance in the south, Arnim wanted the 1st Army to withdraw to Wadi Akarit on 25 March but Liebenstein and Messe preferred to counter-attack with the 15th Panzer Division.

The threat to Maknassy and the possibility of the II US Corps reaching Gabès and cutting off the 1st Army, meant that they had to retire from Mareth and then from Tebaga.

It appeared that the 164th Light and 21st Panzer divisions had not expected a daylight assault and had been surprised; the setting sun, wind and dust had made observation difficult.

On the left, a minefield covered by anti-tank guns was bypassed on both sides to close up to the second objective, clearing a gap for the 1st Armoured Division, despite many Axis posts holding out in the vicinity.

Give my congratulations to all your officers and men, and tell them how pleased I am with all they have done.The Axis forces, despite withdrawing in relatively good order to Wadi Akarit, lost over 7,000 prisoners, of whom 2,500 were German.