Organizational structure of the Central Intelligence Agency
[11] See also CIA Office of Congressional Affairs As the DCIA's principal adviser and representative on military issues, the Associate Director for Military Support (AD/MS), a senior general officer, coordinates CIA efforts to provide Joint Force commanders, who are principally consumers of national-level intelligence but producers of operational intelligence.
[13] President George W. Bush, in creating the National Clandestine Service (NCS), set a clear policy that the CIA would be in charge of all human intelligence (HUMINT) operations.
They recruit solely from the Joint Special Operations Command and are then trained through an extensive course to become a clandestine intelligence officer.
[15] President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12333 titled "United States Intelligence Activities" in 1984.
This order defined covert action as both political and military activities that the US Government could legally deny and granted them exclusively to the CIA.
[15][18] The Pentagon commissioned a study to determine whether the CIA or the Department of Defense (DoD) should conduct covert action paramilitary operations.
Their study determined that the CIA should maintain this capability and be the sole government agency conducting covert action.
The DoD found that it does not have the legal authority to conduct covert action nor the agility to carry out these type of missions.
The CIA, for example, is more likely to obtain HUMINT on terrorists than the very limited foreign resources of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
One proposal suggests using the AD/MS as a prototype, to create an AD/Homeland Security in the CIA, and possibly an equivalent position in the U.S. Justice Department, which, through the FBI and other agencies, legally collects domestic intelligence.
Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE) were quick-response publications, often providing guidance in a crisis, but were still interagency consensus rather than CIA alone.
[22] Originally defined in 1950, this responsibility stated "CIA is now in the business of producing what are called National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) along the lines laid down in NSC 50.
Upon approval by an interagency review committee, the paper becomes a NIE and is sent by the Director of Central Intelligence to the President, appropriate officers of Cabinet level, and the NSC.
In 1999, the CIA created the venture capital firm In-Q-Tel to help fund and develop technologies of interest to the agency.
The Directorate of Operations was created in an attempt to end years of rivalry over influence, philosophy and budget between the United States Department of Defense (DOD) and the CIA.
For example, in a CIA paper on the internal probe into the Bay of Pigs Invasion,[35] there are several comments on the Directorate of Plans organizational structure in 1962.
Warner explains "operational details fell to Branch 4 (Cuba) of the DDP's Western Hemisphere Division (WH)", with some exceptions.
To confuse matters still further, Branch 4 had no direct control over the Brigade's aircraft, which were managed by a separate DDP division that also took some orders directly from Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) Charles P. Cabell, a US Air Force general who liked to keep his hand in the planning of airdrops and other missions."
Warner's paper also mentions that certain DDP groups were outside the scope of the post-mortem by Executive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick, but their mention tells us that these were representative components of the DDP: "... the Havana station or the Santiago base, the development of foreign intelligence assets and liaison contacts, Division D's technical collection programs, or counter-intelligence work against the Cuban services."
"Bases", however, are large facilities for supporting operations, typically with an airfield, secure warehouses, barracks and training areas.
Division D was the joint CIA-NSA collection effort, where CIA would use clandestine operations personnel to emplace NSA SIGINT sensors.
[39][40] The Office of Transnational Issues[41] applies unique functional expertise to assesses perceived existing and emerging threats to US national security and provides senior policymakers, military planners, and law enforcement with analysis, warning, and crisis support.
It receives the output of national technical means of verification and works with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
[46] The Counterintelligence Center Analysis Group[47] identifies, monitors, and analyzes the efforts of foreign intelligence entities, both national and non-national, against US government interests.
When DCI Smith created the Directorate of Plans and ended the autonomy of the OPC and OSO, he recognized it was necessary to establish logistical support for these operations before the start of a hot war.
According to Smith's memo, A major logistical support base will consist of a CIA base headquarters, training, communications, medical accommodation for evacuees and storage for six months' hot war requirements as well as provide logistical support for CIA operational groups or headquarters ...
While the course outline has never been revealed, it is believed to include such things as surveillance, countersurveillance, cryptography, paramilitary training as well as other tradecraft.
Evaluation techniques for the CIA's World War II predecessor, the OSS, were published as the book Assessment of Men, Selection of Personnel for the office of Strategic Services.
The OIG conducts inspections, investigations, and audits at Headquarters and in the field, and oversees the Agency-wide grievance-handling system.
In February 2008, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Michael V. Hayden, sent a message to employees that Inspector General John L. Helgerson will accept increased control over the investigations by that office, saying "John has chosen to take a number of steps to heighten the efficiency, assure the quality and increase the transparency of the investigation process".
