After the partition of India by United Kingdom, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was divided into two territories separated by 1,000 miles (1,600 km) (prior to the independence of Bangladesh in 1971).

A. K. Niazi revised the existing plan according to the Pakistan Army's General Headquarters (GHQ) directive (which emphasized the need to prevent the Mukti Bahini from occupying any area of the province and to fight for every inch of territory).

[3][4] HQ expected the Indians to occupy a large area of the province, transfer the Mukti Bahini and Bengali refugees there and recognize the Bangladesh government in exile – turning the insurgency into an international diplomatic issue.

[5] Lieutenant General Niazi designated 10 cities (Jessore, Jhenaidah, Bogra, Rangpur, Jamalpur, Mymensingh, Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong) on major communication hubs as "fortress towns" and placed the bulk of his troops near the Indian border.

[6][7] The final plan called for the armed forces to delay Indian attacks at the border and then gradually fall back to the fortress towns.

This under-strength division comprised three infantry brigades, with no armour and supported by 10 EPR wings, 12 F-86 Saber planes, and three gunboats[21] rode out the 1965 war in the east.

The Pakistan Eastern Command headquarters was inaugurated in Dacca Cantonment, Dacca on 23 August 1969 and Lt. Gen. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan was appointed as the commander; on 1 September 1969, the Chief Martial Law Administrator of the country, General Yahya Khan, sent Vice-Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan as Martial Law Administrator of East Pakistan.

Air Commodore Masud backed Admiral Ahsan, as he believed that an autonomous East Pakistan was preferable to the certainty of military defeat if India decided to intervene.

There was no contingency plan for any Indian military action – the main reason Generals Yakub, Khadim and Farman had opposed launching the operation.

[34] Pakistani forces occupied Bangladesh, and Gen. Gul Hassan, then Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan army, and no admirer of Gen. Niazi from 11 April 1971[35] – expressed satisfaction with the situation in mid-April.

[37] Until the end of 1971, General Yahya Khan's government was unable to find an active military administrator comparable to Admiral Ahsan as the civil war in East Pakistan intensified.

General Hamid ruled out any provocations that might provoke Indian retaliation, while outlining the main objective of the Eastern Command: to keep the insurgency under control and prevent the formation of a Bangladesh government inside the province.

[82] To fill the manpower gap, the East Pakistan Civil Armed Force (EPCAF) (17 planes and approximately 23,000 personnel)[83] and Razakars (40,000 members, against a target of 1,000,000)[84] were raised after June 1971.

When Pakistani planners assumed India would launch its main attack in the east along the Akhaura – Brahmanbaria axis, it had no brigades available to cover this area.

General Niazi hoped that by creating five divisional HQs and simulating the signal traffic of numerous brigades, he would deceive the Indian Eastern Command into committing at least 15 infantry divisions and other assorted supporting forces in the east; this would mean India would have less to deploy in the west after retaining forces to use against any possible Chinese attacks from the north[97] (or at least deter the Indians from aggressive action).

The underdeveloped state of the eastern communication infrastructures and the river system cutting through the plains was a formidable challenge to the movement of troops and supplies.

Mittha (Quartermaster General, Pakistan Army) had recommended setting up river-transport battalions, cargo and tanker flotillas and increasing the number of helicopters in the province (none of which happened).

Instead, the C-130 planes (which had played a crucial role during Operation Searchlight) were withdrawn from the province,[citation needed] diminishing the airlift capacity of the Pakistani forces further.

The Mukti Bahini had sabotaged 231 bridges and 122 rail lines[103] by November 1971 (thus diminishing transport capacity to 10 percent of normal), and complicated the delivery of the daily minimum 600 tons of supplies to the army units.

Bakir (COS 3 Corps), Rear Admiral Sharif and Air Commodore Inamul Haque Khan) reviewed the existing plan and updated it to factor in the manpower shortage, logistical difficulties, and the directive of the GHQ to defend every inch of East Pakistan.

Pakistani planners assumed (based on intelligence estimates) that an Indian force of 8 to 12 infantry divisions, an armoured brigade and the Mukti Bahini would launch the invasion of East Pakistan during the winter.

Pakistani planners were undecided on whether the Indian attack would come from the Siliguri Corridor south towards Bogra or on the Hili–Chilimari axis (from southwest to northeast) to cut the area in two.

The general plan of defence was: Western Sector: This area (south of the Padma and east of the Meghna) contained the Khulna, Jessore, Kushtia, Faridpur, Barisal and Patuakhali districts and was defended by the 9th Division (GOC Maj. Gen. Ansari) made up of two infantry brigades: the 107th (Commander Brig.

Pakistani planners assumed three likely axes of advance from the Indian army:[123][124] The 107th Brigade (the 12th Punjab, the 15th and 22nd FF Battalions) was tasked with guarding the Benapol axis.

In addition, the 55th Field Artillery Regiment and the heavy mortar battery was attached to the brigade and the 12th and 21st Punjab Battalions were deployed near its operational area.

In September an ad hoc brigade – the 314th[125] (CO Col. Fazle Hamid, one Mujahib battalion and five companies each from EPCAF and Razakars) was created to defend the city of Khulna.

The brigades also had the option to fall back across the Madhumati River (which formed part of the Dhaka outer defence line) and defend the area between Faridpur, Kamarkhali and Goalanda.

[132] Gen. Hassan supposedly tried to get the plan revised several times and insisted on abandoning the concept of defending every inch of the province, wanted the Eastern Command to redeploy regular units away from the border, fight for the BoPs and strong points on a limited scale and ensure Dhaka Bowl had enough reserves instead of the gradual withdrawal of forces to Dhaka outlined in the existing plan.

From September onwards Pakistani forces had begun to fortify positions with concrete bunkers, anti-tank ditches, land mines and barbed wires.

The Pakistani army had been fighting the insurgency nonstop for eight months and was severely fatigued[145] and short of supplies; in addition, the deployment near the border had robbed them of the manoeuvrability needed for a flexible defence.