Philia
As Gerard Hughes points out, in Books VIII and IX of his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle gives examples of philia including: young lovers (1156b2), lifelong friends (1156b12), cities with one another (1157a26), political or business contacts (1158a28), parents and children (1158b20), fellow-voyagers and fellow-soldiers (1159b28), members of the same religious society (1160a19), or of the same tribe (1161b14), a cobbler and the person who buys from him.
When he is talking about the character or disposition that falls between obsequiousness or flattery on the one hand and surliness or quarrelsomeness on the other, he says that this state: has no name, but it would seem to be most like [philia]; for the character of the person in the intermediate state is just what we mean in speaking of a decent friend, except that the friend is also fond of us.
In his Rhetoric, Aristotle defines the activity involved in philia (τὸ φιλεῖν) as: wanting for someone what one thinks good, for his sake and not for one's own, and being inclined, so far as one can, to do such things for him.
Thus] the different forms of φιλíα [as listed above] could be viewed just as different contexts and circumstances in which this kind of mutual well-doing can arise.
[3]Aristotle takes philia to be both necessary as a means to happiness ("no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other goods" [1155a5–6]) and noble or fine (καλόν) in itself.
Buying merchandise, for example, may require meeting another person but usually needs only a very shallow relationship between the buyer and seller.
Some examples of these might include love of father to son, elder to younger or ruler to subject.
(1169a12–15) Aristotle also holds, though, that, as Hughes puts it: "[t]he only ultimately justifiable reason for doing anything is that acting in that way will contribute to a fulfilled life.
"[5] Thus acts of philia might seem to be essentially egoistic, performed apparently to help others, but in fact intended to increase the agent's happiness.
