All of these are similar to direct reciprocity, since the beneficiaries are identified as such in each case, and contributors know exactly what they can expect in return.
All of these patterns of reciprocity, along with related ideas such as gratitude, have been central to social and political philosophy from Plato onward.
Philosophical work on reciprocity often pays considerable attention, directly or indirectly, to the proper interpretation of one or more of the following conceptual issues.
Reciprocity pointedly covers arm’s-length dealings between egoistic or mutually disinterested people.
In this, it also differs from the golden rule, which is compatible with forgiveness and "turning the other cheek" but has notorious difficulties as a basis for corrective justice, punishment, and dealing with people (e.g., masochists) who have unusual motivational structures.
Reciprocity, by contrast, because it does not necessarily involve having special feelings of love or benevolence, fits more comfortably into discussions of duties and obligations.
The norm of reciprocity thus requires that we make fitting and proportional responses to both the benefits and harms we receive – whether they come from people who have been benevolent or malicious.
The following matters are all considered at length in many of the sources listed below under References, and those authors typically defend particular proposals about how best to define the conceptual details of reciprocity.
Reflective people typically practice a highly nuanced version of the norm of reciprocity for social life, in which the qualitative similarity or fittingness of the response appears to be determined by a number of factors.
But when the nature of the transaction is more loosely defined, or is embedded in a complex personal relationship, an appropriate reciprocal response often requires spontaneity, imagination, and even a lack of premeditation about where, what, and how soon.
A third aspect of qualitative fit is the presence or absence of circumstances that undermine the usual expectations about reciprocity.
In some cases, such as borrowing a sum of money from a friend who has roughly the same resources, a prompt and exact return of the same amount seems right.
But in other cases, especially in exchanges between people who are very unequal in resources, a literal reading of tit-for-tat may be a perverse rule – one that undermines the social and personal benefits of the norm of reciprocity itself.
Requiring a prompt and exact return of the benefit received may defeat the general purpose of the norm of reciprocity by driving disadvantaged people further into debt.
Bankruptcy rules are in part designed to prevent downward, irrecoverable spirals of debt while still exacting a considerable penalty.
Similarly, there are rules for rescinding unconscionable contracts, preventing unjust enrichment, and dealing with cases in which contractual obligations have become impossible to perform.
Those things, further, involve acting in a principled, impartial way that forbids playing favorites and may require sacrifices.
When war represents a disproportionate response to a threat or an injury, it raises questions of justice related to reciprocity.
When war fighting employs weapons that do not discriminate between combatants and noncombatants, it raises questions of justice related to reciprocity.
[7][8] Political solutions which end the violence without dealing with the underlying injustice run the risk of continued social instability.
A very deep and persistent line of philosophical discussion explores the way in which reciprocity can resolve conflicts between justice and self-interest, and can justify the imposition (or limitation) of social, political, and legal obligations that require individuals to sacrifice their own interests.
So the problem becomes one of showing whether, and when, it might actually be mutually advantageous to follow the rules of justice even when it is inconvenient or costly to do so.
So if we can arrange a system of reciprocity in which all the benefits we are required to contribute are typically returned to us in full (or more), that may justify playing by the rules—even in cases where it looks as though we can get away with not doing so.
Here too, the value of reciprocal relationships can be invoked, this time to limit the legitimacy of the sacrifices a society might require.
This has been part of the attraction of the most influential line of thought on distributive justice in recent Anglo-American philosophy – the one carried on in the context of John Rawls’ work.
Rawls considers (briefly) the problem of defining a "just savings principle" for future generations, and treats it as a consequence of the interests people typically have in the welfare of their descendants, and the agreements fully reciprocal members of society would come to among themselves about such matters.
If such relationships are ideally ones in which the parties are connected by mutual affection and benevolence, shouldn't justice and reciprocity stay out of their way?
Some contemporary philosophers have criticized major figures in the history of Western philosophy, including John Rawls’ early work, for making familial relationships more or less opaque in theories of justice.
Since the family is "the school of justice," if it is unjust the moral education of children is distorted, and the injustice tends to spread to the society at large, and to be perpetuated in following generations.
This said, Nick Founder in "Finding True Friends" (2015) observes that reciprocation in personal relationships rarely follows a mathematical formula and the level of reciprocation, i.e. the give and take, will vary depending on the personalities involved, and situational factors such as which party has more control, persuasive power or influence.