[1] Alaska's unified command ratified the volume of crude oil spilled as 212,252 US gallons (5,053.6 bbl) in March 2008.
[2] In November 2007, BPXA pleaded guilty to negligent discharge of oil, which prosecutors said was the result of BP's knowing neglect of corroding pipelines, a misdemeanor under the federal Clean Water Act, and was fined US$20 million.
[3] In July 2011, BPXA paid a $25 million civil penalty, the largest per-barrel penalty at that time for an oil spill, and agreed to take measures to significantly improve inspection and maintenance of its pipeline infrastructure on the North Slope to reduce the threat of additional oil spills.
In November 2012, it was announced that the U.S. state of Alaska would collect $255 million related to BP Plc's pipeline leaks and a resulting shutdown in 2006.
In an e-mail to a company lawyer in June 2004, Marc Kovac, an official of the United Steelworkers union representing workers at the BP facility, forwarded a collection of his earlier complaints to management.
[12] John Dingell read from an internal BP email that said budgetary constraints would force the end of a programme to inject corrosion inhibitor directly into the pipeline system.
[13]: 1 According to the Unified Command (consisting of several groups including BP, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) Final Report, "The source was a quarter inch hole at the 6 o'clock position in an above ground 34-inch diameter crude oil transit pipeline.
BP executives said they were surprised that corrosion developed in the large trunk lines because they did not carry much water mixed with the oil.
U.S. Chemical Safety Board chairman Carolyn Merritt said in a congressional hearing that there were striking similarities between the accidents of Texas City and Prudhoe Bay, including "long delays in implementation, administrative documentation of close-out even though remedial actions were not actually taken, or simple non-compliance" as well as "flawed communication of lessons learned, excessive decentralization of safety functions, and high management turnover.
"[15] On March 15, 2006, the U.S. Transportation Department ordered BP to test its three low-pressure lines in Prudhoe Bay for corrosion using a smart pig.
[17] Later, BP decided not to shut the western side of the field, meaning Prudhoe Bay would still produce about 200,000 barrels a day, half its normal total.
The company had to face tough questions from the public and shareholders about why the $200 million a year it spent in maintenance was not enough to keep the 400,000-barrel-per-day (64,000 m3/d) field, the country's largest, running smoothly.
BP's Steve Marshall detailed measures for pigging or removing oil residue from the pipeline and for various draining and dismantling procedures.
BP also announced a planned maintenance-repair budget for the Greater Prudhoe Bay area of $195 million for 2007, roughly four times what was spent in 2004.
Two segments of the transit system were scheduled to be replaced in 2007 and two in the winter of 2008, with a goal to have the entire module work completed by the end of 2008.
[25] On November 9, 2009, a spill occurred from an 18-inch three-phase common line carrying a mixture of crude oil, produced water, and natural gas at BP's Lisburne field,[26][27] part of the greater Prudhoe Bay area.
Under the consent decree, BPXA paid a $25 million civil penalty, the largest per-barrel penalty at that time for an oil spill, and agreed to take measures to significantly improve inspection and maintenance of its pipeline infrastructure on the North Slope to reduce the threat of additional oil spills.
[32][33][34][35] In November 2012, it was announced that the U.S. state of Alaska would collect $255 million related to BP Plc's pipeline leaks and a resulting shutdown in 2006.
The payment, which was final and not subject to appeal, included a $245 million award for lost state royalties and interest and $10 million which included per-gallon environmental penalties for the spills, fines for natural resource damages and other civil charges to settle civil assessments for the spills.
BP argued that no money was owed to the state for lost production, but the arbitration panel concluded that the pipeline problems and associated reservoir complications resulted in lost or deferred production of more than 30 million barrels of oil and natural-gas liquids until the end of the oil field's life.