RAF Coastal Command during World War II
A limited number of detachments served in the Mediterranean, Middle East and African theatres under the control of Coastal Command from 1941, operating from a headquarters in Gibraltar.
Harris, since his days as a group captain at the Air Ministry's strategic planning division, had attacked the use of resources in maritime aviation, suggesting that bombing enemy shipyards and port facilities would solve the threat to trade defence.
De la Ferté wrote to the Ministry arguing the Liberator should be used for reconnaissance work, rather than bomb load for the solitary squadron being accepted at that time.
After replacing Bowhill in 1941, de la Ferté had issued a directive on 12 June 1941 to use Wellingtons and Whitleys as an interim solution to unrestricted submarine warfare now practised by the Germans.
The 250 lb (110 kg) weapon was cleared for use on 23 January 1941 and by May tests revealed the tail fin had improved the accuracy of the charge when dropped from any height up to 250 ft (76 m).
The 250 lb (110 kg) Mark IX DC with Torpex filling dropped in sticks of four to eight, anywhere from "point-blank altitude" and within 150 ft (46 m) of the target, proved decisive.
Operational research documents explain that the weight, ammunition loads, and the fact the weapon fired too few rounds before components were worn out, contributed to the abandonment of its use.
de Havilland Mosquitos fitted with a Molins "6-pounder Class M" cannon, a modification of the QF 6-pounder anti-tank gun proved a hugely successful maritime strike aircraft.
The need for intensive training, a lack of aircraft, priority being given to the Navy, and production limitations for low-level bomb sights; all these factors influenced the policy on torpedo usage.
Instead of fixed aerials there was a rotary scanner, and thus the return signals gave a visual trace through 360 degrees on a CRT known as the Plan Position Indicator (PPI).
500 Squadron possibly shot down Coastal Command's first air-to-air victories of the war by dispatching two Messerschmitt Bf 109s trying to intercept their Avro Anson.
[44] The occupation of continental Europe and the Scandinavian North Sea coastline now meant tracking U-boats and enemy warships making for the Atlantic was now more difficult with the thin resource pool available.
Coastal Command aircraft had proven best able to locate U-boats, but the flawed anti-submarine bombs (ASBs) meant that they could not inflict severe damage to enemy submarines.
An 818 Naval Air Squadron FAA aircraft piloted by Sub-Lieutenant John Moffat hit the Bismarck with a torpedo on its stern, jamming its rudder gears, which eventually led to its sinking.
Coastal Command only had one complete and one half trained squadron of Beuaforts covering the area from Norway to the Bay of Biscay, or only three aircraft for every 100 mi (160 km).
At the time, Coastal Command had only 60 Avro Ansons, Armstrong Whitworth Whitleys, Short Sunderlands, and Lockheed Hudsons, all too slow and most too lightly armed to intercept the Fw 200.
Nevertheless, great efforts were made with limited resources to provide cover from first to last light, the time when U-boats could use the rising and setting sun to see the silhouettes on the horizon.
Arthur Harris, AOC Bomber Command, and the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), were in favour of knocking out their bases and attacking submarine construction yards.
The Liberator and increased numbers of British types, including the Halifax and Lancaster bomber, in part, were diverted to Coastal Command to deal with the U-boat threat in March.
[101] When renewed air operations began over the Bay, the Command found U-boats not only adhering to a new strategy (of avoidance), they discovered the Germans obeying new tactical instructions.
Dornier Do 217 and Ju 88s, equipped with Henschel Hs 293 radio-controlled glide bombs, were also used and forced Royal Navy units to abandon attacking submarines in the region.
This tactical move corrected Dönitz's earlier mistakes of allowing transit within range of Allied air bases, and the Germans regained a measure of safety in the Bay.
In later months, the Schnorchel became available, a device originated by the Dutch and later adopted by the Kriegsmarine after the Germans invaded the Netherlands, and capable of allowing a U-boat to replace its air supply and vent its diesel exhaust without surfacing.
The Bay of Biscay patrol statistics for the period 1 May to 2 August 1943, show Coastal Command had flown for 32,343 hours and lost 57 aircraft to all causes, sinking 28 U-boats and damaging 22.
[112] Up to the end of 1940, Coastal Command's Anti-shipping Operations (ASO) campaign against German seaborne trade in north-west European waters had claimed a direct attack on only six vessels, totalling 5,561 tons, and 14 others badly damaged.
The extent of the intelligence vacuum at the start of Coastal Command's campaign is demonstrated by the fact that Air Ministry planners were unaware of the heavy anti-aircraft armament being fitted to enemy merchant vessels.
[115] In mid-1941, just as ASO units were finding their feet, a large number of personnel and aircraft were sent to Malta (and the Desert Air Force) to interdict Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps supplies from Italy to North Africa.
Instead, aircrew relied on the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI), salvage tugs, vessels in the vicinity, or if in range, the High Speed Launches (HSL) established at flying boat bases.
Eager to evaluate them, the British Army carried out Operation Biting, a commando raid to capture, dismantle and transport an example of the mobile radar to Britain.
544 Squadron RAF, another Coastal Command veteran, flew missions during Operation Frugal, flying Top Secret mail to the Soviet Union, during the Fourth Moscow Conference, 9 to 20 October 1944.
