Rhodesian mission in Lisbon
In their attempt to prove that an independent Lisbon mission was legal, the Rhodesians presented an argument based on British legislation conferring on the colonial government the right to appoint its own "diplomatic agents, or consular or trade representatives, in countries which are willing to receive them".
Following months of abortive Anglo-Rhodesian talks and unsuccessful attempts by Britain to deter Portugal diplomatically, Reedman travelled to Lisbon in September 1965 to take up his post at the head of an independent Rhodesian mission.
[6] As most of the Southern Rhodesian politicians saw it, they were as good as independent; if full autonomy were granted in the form of dominionship, the only practical difference would be a rise in expenses for foreign representation, as Salisbury would have to maintain its own embassies abroad.
[14] Already wary of black nationalism on racial grounds, Salisbury became increasingly antipathetic towards it as a result of these developments, particularly when the brutal Congo Crisis caused thousands of Congolese whites to become refugees in Northern and Southern Rhodesia.
[8] Prime Minister Winston Field's failure to secure independence from Britain during early 1964 led to his forced resignation and replacement by his deputy, Ian Smith, in April that year.
[25] Two months into his premiership, Smith was deeply offended when Whitehall informed him that, for the first time since 1932, Southern Rhodesia would not be represented at the year's Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference as the decision had been taken to only include fully independent states in future.
[26] The quarrel over the terms for independence caused the Southern Rhodesian military's traditional British and American suppliers to impose an informal embargo,[1] and motivated Britain to cut off financial aid to Salisbury around the same time.
[31] The Rhodesian government was ardently anti-communist, and opposed immediate black rule, which Smith said would cause "the destruction of our country",[32] pointing to ongoing events such as the Congo Crisis as evidence.
"[34] The Labour Cabinet of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, which replaced the previous Conservative administration in October 1964, did not give credence to the Rhodesian tests of opinion, and insisted on majority rule as a condition for independence.
[35] The Commonwealth repeatedly urged Britain to intervene directly should Rhodesian defiance continue,[36] while British liberals worried that if left unchecked Salisbury might drift towards South African-style apartheid.
[41] Also contributory was the disproportionate sway over Britain's African policy held by Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania, who was a fervent proponent for majority rule across Africa without delay, implemented by military force if need be.
[42] In the immediate post-Federal period, Britain forlornly tried to stifle Rhodesia's further alignment with South Africa and Portugal, realising that British influence in the region was severely limited while the three remained so closely linked.
On first meeting in Portugal in September 1964, the two Prime Ministers found they shared many common views regarding race relations in their respective countries, Britain's handling of the Commonwealth, and what Smith called the "complacency of the major powers of the free world" in the face of what the pair saw as inexorable communist expansionism.
[1] Gibbs then said that Rhodesia wished to have the best possible relations with its neighbours, and startled British observers by saying the government had informed him that it would follow recommendations made by Portugal during recent talks, and would open its own diplomatic mission in the Portuguese capital Lisbon as soon as was practical.
Reedman, the former minister for immigration and tourism, was also a retired officer of the British Royal Air Force (where he had been involved in bomber research), and an experienced engineer and businessman: all the right ingredients, the government thought, for someone in the position to source European aircraft, weapons and other equipment, while also representing Rhodesian interests in mainland Europe.
[47] Lord Brockway, head of the Movement for Colonial Freedom, believed that Rhodesia was attempting to assert de facto independence in the eyes of the international community by deliberately defying Britain over the Lisbon issue.
[49] In Bottomley's absence, his office explored the issue and resolved that Rhodesia could retain its representative in South Africa, but should not be allowed to appoint another in Lisbon; a consul was acceptable, they concluded, but only as part of the British Embassy staff.
[51] Smith delivered an openly defiant speech to his parliament on 30 June, attacking Britain for its handling of the Commonwealth's newer members, which he said were unduly influencing British policy in Africa.
Wilson considered this a matter of urgency as he had heard a rumour that Rhodesia might declare independence on its main national holiday, Rhodes' Day (that year 12 July), but this proved false.
[59] Bottomley toured West Africa during early August, and, in Ghana and Nigeria, gave several speeches reassuring his hosts that immediate majority rule was an unconditional requirement for Rhodesian independence.
He dismissed Johnston's threat to expel the Rhodesian representatives in West Germany, Japan and America; relations with Portugal and South Africa were far more important, he said, as they were Rhodesia's two closest neighbours geographically.
The Italian, Belgian, Danish, French and U.S. delegates in turn sided with Britain, and collectively asked da Cunha to tell his government to publicly declare its non-acceptance of Reedman while he lacked British approval.
[74] Speaking publicly in Salisbury the same evening, Dupont told reporters that there had never been any intention to claim ambassadorial status for Reedman, and that Rhodesia had constantly kept Britain informed of what was happening regarding the appointment.
The Zoios were interested in stocking Rhodesia's arsenal, and promptly agreed to arrange an order of weapons from a third party on Reedman's behalf in exchange for a letter of credit from the Rhodesian government.
[71] Pretending their client was the government of Pakistan, the Zoio brothers contacted a licensed arms dealer from England, Major W R L Turp MBE of Bexley, Kent, who quickly agreed in principle, requesting a letter of credit from a Geneva bank and appropriate end-user certificates for the weapons.
British Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend rejected this view, pointing to Lisbon's conduct regarding Reedman, which he said showed the Portuguese "ha[d] very clearly made up their minds" to support a Rhodesian UDI.
[85] The next day the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 216, which condemned the declaration as an illegal one "made by a racist minority", and called on all member states to withhold diplomatic recognition.
[90] Clandestine trade with other nations continued, initially at a reduced level; among other things, Portugal illicitly labelled unsold Rhodesian tobacco as Mozambican product, then sold it on Salisbury's behalf in Europe and Asia.
[citation needed] When Rhodesia adopted a republican constitution in 1970, Portugal bowed to British diplomatic pressure and withdrew its consul-general, João de Freitas Cruz, from Salisbury, but the Rhodesian office in Lisbon remained open.
By contrast to the former authoritarian government, which had been committed to a pluricontinental Portugal, fighting costly wars against independence movements in its African territories to maintain it, the new leftist administration rapidly initiated moves to withdraw from Africa as quickly as possible.
