General Sir Richard Cyril Byrne Haking (24 January 1862 – 9 June 1945) was a senior British Army officer who is most notable for being the commander of XI Corps during the majority of the First World War.

Haking is remembered chiefly for the high casualties suffered by his forces (including many Australian troops) at the second attack at Fromelles, launched while the Battle of the Somme was underway 80 km to the south, although at least one British historian has sought to defend his reputation, regarding him as an "intelligent and capable man" unfairly maligned in the popular mythology of the war.

[2] Although blocked from further promotion, he continued to command XI Corps – including in Italy in the winter of 1917–1918 and in Flanders in April 1918 – until the end of the war in November 1918.

[20][21] The book was considered "first class" and in Gordon Corrigan's view "even today ... has a freshness about it and an insight into human characteristics that would not be out of place in a modern military work".

[3][23][24] Still in command of the brigade in the summer of 1914, when the First World War began, Haking took it to the Western Front, with the division itself forming part of Lieutenant General Douglas Haig's I Corps.

On 23 August 1914—the day of the Battle of Mons—in accordance with a request by Lieutenant General Horace Smith-Dorrien, general officer commanding (GOC) II Corps, Haig sent Haking with three battalions to make contact with II Corps on Haig's left, but Haking reported back that he had made no contact with the enemy.

The promotion was not confirmed until 4 September as Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, was ill. Haking, now a temporary lieutenant-general,[35] would hold this command until the end of the war.

Although "everyone was too optimistic", Haking's promises to Regimental officers that there would be "very little opposition" were "altogether misleading" and a "most regrettable travesty of the real facts" (testimony of various colonels to the Official Historian in the mid-1920s).

Haking also lifted the artillery barrage off the German front positions to bombard more distant targets at 3 pm, an hour before the attack was due to begin – Rawlinson, who visited him at 10 am, thought this a bad idea, but kept his doubts to himself.

Lloyd agrees with Prior & Wilson that the blame for the decision to continue the attack on the second day lies with Haig, although he points out that Haking took his men forward without any doubts.

However, Haking later – after a meeting with Haig – claimed that this had been based on "memory of verbal statements made to (him)" by the commanders of 21st and 24th Divisions on the night of 25 September.

Haig's and Haking's slur was bitterly resented by a number of officers who later testified to the Official Historian in the 1920s about traffic congestion and poor direction by the Military Police.

Haking persuaded himself that the enemy were "shaken and disorganised" ("little more than wishful thinking" in Lloyd's view) and that enough artillery and gas was now available to win a decisive victory (in the event the bombardment did little damage to the German positions).

[50] In John Bourne's view "Haking had already begun to achieve a reputation as something of a loose cannon … he did more than anyone in the BEF to encourage trench raids and "the spirit of the bayonet"".

[51] Haking launched what John Bourne describes as "an unnecessary and unsuccessful attack" against a German position called the Boar's Head (19–30 June 1916).

[53] At a conference of his corps commanders (8 July) Charles Monro (GOC First Army) said that the Battle of the Somme was progressing "favourably", but ordered Haking to prepare a plan on the assumption that he was to be assisted by a division of Second Army and some extra artillery (on the same day 4th Australian Division was ordered south to the Somme but instructed to leave behind its artillery).

Haking presented a scheme to Monro (9 July) for a two-division attack over a front of 4,200 yards, aiming to capture part of Aubers-Fromelles Ridge, which lay a mile or so behind the German line.

Monro initially rejected this plan in favour of a Canadian attack at Vimy Ridge, but after pressure from GHQ – caused by the movement of German reserves from Lille to the Somme sector – informed Haking (13 July) that it was to go ahead.

[52] At a meeting with Haking, Monro, Plumer, Barrow and Harington on 16 July, Butler reiterated Haig's conditions that sufficient guns and ammunition for counter-battery work be available, and pointed out that intelligence reports of the movement of German reserves meant that the attack was no longer so urgently required.

At 8.30 am he sent a despatch in which, contradicting the assurances he had given, he admitted that many of the Australian gunners had never fired on the Western Front before, and that many of the infantry were "not fully trained" and "do not appear to be very anxious for the attack to be delivered".

[52] This earned the undying disgust of the commander of the Australian 15th Brigade, Brigadier-General Harold "Pompey" Elliott, who had seen 80% of his two assaulting battalions killed, wounded or captured by night-fall.

Elliott later claimed in his notes on the battle that McCay had only learned at 8.35 pm, from 61st Division, that the latter's attack had been cancelled, too late to stop 58th Battalion going forward, and that the blame therefore lay with Haking.

Haking now ordered British 184th Brigade to attack the Sugar Loaf at 3 am to assist the Australians, whilst McCay was authorised to reinforce his forward positions.

During the meeting an up-to-date report was received from 5th Australian Division HQ, and Monro and Haking ordered that 14th Brigade was to be withdrawn from the German front line rather than reinforced.

[67] Monro and Haking concurred with McCay's veto of a proposal (21 July) that an informal local truce be negotiated in the Australian sector to allow the wounded to be collected, although this was in accordance with official GHQ policy at the time.

[72] By 26 July Haking had received McCay's report and was more generous in his praise of the Australians, although he blamed 61st Division for failing to take the Sugar Loaf.

Captain Philip Landon testified to Edmonds in 1938 that it had been "as good an illustration as there was of the reckless extravagance in expenditure of life (italics in original) which ruled the minds of some of the subordinate commanders, like Gen Haking, at this stage of the war" ... "the weakness of GHQ lay in not seeing that a Corps Commander, left to himself, would also be tempted to win glory for his Corps by spectacular success, and would be prodigal in using the Divisions which passed through his hands for this purpose".

[53] In the Official History Wilfrid Miles later wrote scathingly of the lack of preparation and the pointlessness of an attack by inexperienced troops, to seize a position which they could not possibly have held against counterattacks, and blames First Army for not cancelling the operation.

[82] Haking protested to Horne (GOC First Army) on 18 March 1917 about how he was expected to hold a four-division stretch of front with two divisions, putting too much strain on the units involved.

[4] His rank of lieutenant-general being made permanent in January 1919,[90] Haking was appointed a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire (GBE) in the 1921 New Year Honours.