Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), was a landmark case in the area of federal Indian law involving issues of great importance to the meaning of tribal sovereignty in the contemporary United States.

The Supreme Court sustained a law passed by the governing body of the Santa Clara Pueblo that explicitly discriminated on the basis of sex.

[1] In so doing, the Court advanced a theory of tribal sovereignty that weighed the interests of tribes sufficient to justify a law that, had it been passed by a state legislature or Congress, would have almost certainly been struck down as a violation of equal protection.

Martinez was married to a member of the Navajo Nation, and, according to the ordinance her children were ineligible for membership in the Santa Clara Pueblo.

[3] The Petitioner's Brief observed that this exclusion from Pueblo membership had no bearing on whether Martinez's children (and others similarly situated) could receive federal benefits provided to Indians generally.

[4] Martinez claimed that the tribe's membership ordinance discriminated on the basis of both sex and ancestry in violation of Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) (Pub.L.

73, enacted April 11, 1968), which provides in relevant part that no "Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.

[6] Justice Thurgood Marshall began the majority opinion by discussing general principles of tribal sovereignty relevant to the case.

To emphasize the importance of this decision, Justice Marshall observed that finding a private cause-of-action would interfere with tribal sovereignty in a way the text of the statute does not, on its own terms, allow.

[11] Justice Marshall proceeded to analyze the statute's legislative history and structure under the Supreme Court's implied cause-of-action case law.

For example, ICRA made no mention of a prohibition on the establishment of religion or require the appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants.

Creating a cause-of-action would undermine the latter goal of ICRA and, in addition, impose significant financial burdens on the already economically disadvantaged tribes.

In light of this history, Justice Marshall decided it would be "highly unlikely" that Congress intended to create a private cause-of-action in federal courts to enforce ICRA.

In finding no private cause-of-action, the ability of individual tribe members to bring cases in a federal court for alleged violations of their rights under ICRA, was greatly diminished.

Santa Clara has been cited and discussed by the Supreme Court in a diverse set of subsequent Indian law decisions.

Notable examples include: Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982): In upholding a tribal tax of on-reservation oil and gas production as an exercise of the inherent sovereignty of a tribe to govern its internal affairs, the Court (in an opinion by Justice Marshall) cited the passage in Santa Clara stating that it will "tread lightly" where Congress has not expressly indicated its intent as to whether it has used its plenary power to abridge tribal sovereignty.

[21] Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment, cited Santa Clara to illustrate the principle that tribes possess broad authority to define their membership.

He first observed that Santa Clara affirmed the appropriateness of tribal courts as the exclusive forum for adjudicating disputes involving "important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.

"[24] He contrasted this holding of Santa Clara with cases like Oliphant and Montana, which suggest tribes and their courts lack jurisdiction over non-members.

[26] In her majority opinion, Justice Kagan cited Santa Clara for the proposition that in spite of federal plenary power, tribes remain separate sovereigns who pre-exist the Constitution.

[31] The Final Rule cites Santa Clara to affirm that delineating membership requirements is a sovereign function of tribes.

The Commission cited Santa Clara for the proposition that tribes retain the sovereign authority to establish substantive law and regulate their own internal affairs.

This understanding of tribal sovereignty was considered in connection with a treaty between the Navajo Nation and the United States limiting the kinds of federal officials who could be present and act on the reservation.

[39] The IBIA analyzed Santa Clara in its determination that ICRA did not grant the BIA authority to review the tribal action at issue.

The Brief pointed to the fact that recent Supreme Court precedent established a higher standard for state and federal sex-based classifications: intermediate scrutiny.

[43] Additionally, the mere fact that the Pueblo had a tradition of treating male and female members differently, is not sufficient to justify the classification.

[45] While she recognized the importance of tribal sovereignty, she contended that by disadvantaging women, the ordinance ultimately undermined the tribe's autonomy as a distinct community.

Thus, the decision in Santa Clara advanced Indian feminism insofar as it preserved tribal sovereignty and the ability of the tribe to work through its understanding of gender equality outside the control of United States law and empire.

[50] Skenandore responded to Resnik as well, noting that her argument suggests tribes have been assimilated into the dominant legal culture of the United States and questions their existence as distinct communities.

Women organized and finally got this law changed, challenging it in court and appealing to the United Nations Human Rights Committee.