The Kenyan counter-insurgency General Service Units forced civilians into "protected villages" (essentially concentration camps)[4] as well as killing livestock kept by the pastoralist Somalis.

The war ended in 1967 when Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal, Prime Minister of the Somali Republic, signed a ceasefire with Kenya at the Arusha Conference on 23 October 1967.

At the time under British colonial administration, the northern half of Jubaland was ceded to Italy as a reward for the Italians' support of the Allies during World War I.

[6] Britain retained control of the southern half of the territory, which remained in the Northern Frontier District, and was the former North Eastern province in Kenya (now the county governments of Mandera, Garissa and Wajir).

[14] At this point, KANU was confident that any Somali uprising could be easily crushed; the party's leaders were more concerned that the British might provide support to possible separatist groups to recreate a scenario similar to Congo-Kinshasa which had become independent in 1960, only to suffer from extensive, foreign-supported separatism.

[17] The proposal to unite the NFD with Somalia was widely supported in northern Kenya,[18] even though there were substantial economic and cultural differences as well as tensions within the Somali community.

[21] The British, while initially including NFD delegates in independence negotiations and appearing to entertain secession, eventually reached an agreement with Kenya's first ruling party, KANU, whereby the state's territorial status quo would be maintained.

Hoping to achieve unification with Somalia through a rebellion, NPPPP supporters formed the Northern Frontier Districts Liberation Movement (NFDLM).

The former faction was active between Wajir, Moyale, and Mandera, whereas the latter was led by Maalim Mohammed Stamboul and operated near Garissa and Somalia's southwestern border.

[24] Non-Somalis[24] such as Turkana would also join the insurgents; members of these ethnic groups were mostly motivated by the fear of restrictions on their movement and lifestyle imposed by the Kenyan government.

The first high-profile victims were two Borana leaders, the first African District Commissioner Dabaso Wabera and tribal chief Haji Galma Dido, who were assassinated while a route to Isiolo to urge locals not to back the secessionists.

[26] Kenya was granted independence on 12 December, and in response NPPPP militants staged evening attacks on northern police stations and administrative posts.

[28] Heavy rains prevented security forces from countering the initial insurgency, especially as the guerrillas enjoyed a high level of support among the NFD's civilian population during the rebellion's first year.

[32] This consisted of allowing security forces to detain people up to 56 days without trial, confiscating the property of communities allegedly in retaliation for acts of violence, and restricting the right to assembly and movement.

The northeast—declared a "special district"—was subject to nearly unfettered government control, including the authority to detain, arrest or forcibly move individuals or groups, as well as confiscate possessions and land.

[citation needed] Kenyatta reinforced this portrayal by describing the rebels as mere criminals[34] and claiming that the entire conflict was organized by citizens of Somalia without involvement of Kenyan nationals.

[30] Thus, in February 1964 rebel activity increased after Somalia had received an arms shipment from the Soviet Union but it declined in March as their supplies ran out.

[27] One immediate consequence of the Shifta insurgency was the signing in 1964 of a Mutual Defense Treaty between Jomo Kenyatta's administration and the government of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie.

By 1965 cattle raids had become predominant in the recorded incidents, making it difficult for Kenyan authorities to distinguish violence from local "tribal" issues with attacks related to the secessionist conflict.

However, the Kenya Army began to retake territory and adopted a policy of compulsory villagization in the war-affected area to deprive the insurgents of civilian support.

Disagreeing with the moderation advocated by the British, the last expatriate officers in the security forces were replaced with Kenyans who favored a more aggressive approach.

[41] The United States embassy argued that the removal of the British officers resulted in the Kenya Army and GSU operating with "harsh brutality" in the NFD.

In September an Organisation of African Unity summit was held in Kinshasa, and Kenyan and Somalian delegates decided to reach an agreement regarding the NFD.

[46] The Manyatta strategy is seen as playing a key role in ending the insurgency, though the Somali government may have also decided that the potential benefits of a war simply was not worth the cost and risk.

The soldiers had previously focused on battling rebels and operated with relatively high morale as well as a sense of purpose, receiving regular training and new equipment.

[48] Ultimately, the renewed tensions with Somalia in the 1970s caused the Kenyan leadership to once again request foreign support by Great Britain, the United States, and Israel to improve its military, partially addressing the soldiers' complaints.

In 1971, Garissa South MP Abdi Haji Ahmed complained that the central government had not "forgiven" the NFD's residents for the rebellion, and did not "care if [the locals] live or die", pointing at the lack of water supply and schools in the area.

There, they eked out a bare subsistence, hanging around the petrol stations for odd jobs, hawking for miraa, making illicit alcohol, engaging in prostitution and the like.

[53] The war thus marked the beginning of decades of violent crackdowns and repressive measures by the police in the NFD, coupled with trumped-up allegations and unsubtle innuendo on the part of the Kenyan media, charging the region's almost-exclusively Somali inhabitants with "banditry" and other vices.

[54] The Ogaden War and growing instability of Somalia also resulted in foreign bandits crossing the border to operate in the NFD, causing further insecurity.