However, prior to Brexit, if the effect of a business' conduct would reach across borders, the European Commission has competence to deal with the problems, and exclusively EU law would apply.
[1] The Domesday Book recorded that "foresteel" (i.e. forestalling, the practice of buying up goods before they reach market and then inflating the prices) was one of three forfeitures that King Edward the Confessor could carry out through England.
"[5] Under King Edward III the Statute of Labourers of 1349[6] fixed wages of artificers and workmen and decreed that foodstuffs should be sold at reasonable prices.
On top of existing penalties, the statute stated that overcharging merchants must pay the injured party double the sum he received, an idea that has been replicated in punitive treble damages under US antitrust law.
[7] "...we have ordained and established, that no merchant or other shall make Confederacy, Conspiracy, Coin, Imagination, or Murmur, or Evil Device in any point that may turn to the Impeachment, Disturbance, Defeating or Decay of the said Staples, or of anything that to them pertaineth, or may pertain.
The court found the grant void and that three characteristics of monopoly were (1) price increases; (2) quality decrease; and (3) the tendency to reduce artificers to idleness and beggary.
"The classical British perspective on competition was that certain agreements and business practice could be an unreasonable restraint on the individual liberty of tradespeople to carry on their livelihoods.
This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay.
So in the 1613 case of Rogers v Parry[22] a court held that a joiner who promised not to trade from his house for 21 years could have this bond enforced against him since the time and place was certain.
In times of such slow communications, commerce around the country it seemed axiomatic that a general restraint served no legitimate purpose for one's business and ought to be void.
So in the Nordenfelt[20] case Lord McNaughton ruled that while one could validly promise to "not make guns or ammunition anywhere in the world" it was an unreasonable restraint to "not compete with Maxim in any way."
This approach in England was confirmed by the House of Lords in Mason v The Provident Supply and Clothing Co[26] Modern competition law is heavily influenced by the American experience.
It was thought that one of the ways Hitler and the Emperor had been able to assume such absolute power was simply by bribing or coercing the relatively small numbers of big cartel and zaibatsu chiefs into submission.
A number of key industries had been nationalised, and the new Labour Party was committed to a socialist economic agenda: progressive democratic ownership of the means of production.
After the second world war, this case was strengthened, yet Clement Attlee's Labour government did introduce the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act 1948.
So where a British company is carrying out unfair business practices, is involved in a cartel or is attempting to merge in a way which would disrupt competition across UK borders, the Commission of the European Union will have enforcement powers and exclusively EU law will apply.
Prohibited are... "(1) ...all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market..."Article 101(1) TFEU then gives examples of "hard core" restrictive practices such as price fixing or market sharing and 101(2) TFEU confirms that any agreements are automatically void.
However, just like the Statute of Monopolies 1623, Article 101(3) TFEU creates exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints (or disproportionate, in ECJ terminology) that risk eliminating competition anywhere.
Antitrust, EU law has never been used to punish the existence of dominant firms, but merely imposes a special responsibility to conduct oneself appropriately.
Specific categories of abuse listed in Article 102 EC include price discrimination and exclusive dealing, much the same as sections 2 and 3 of the U.S. Clayton Act.
Also under Article 102 EC, the European Council was empowered to enact a regulation to control mergers between firms, currently the latest known by the abbreviation of ECMR "Reg.
The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition.