[1] Seventeen U.S. Navy sailors were killed and thirty-seven injured[2] in the deadliest attack against a United States naval vessel since the USS Stark incident in 1987.

On 30 October 2020, Sudan and the United States signed a bilateral claims agreement to compensate families of the sailors who died in the bombing.

Former CIA intelligence officer Robert Finke said the blast appeared to be caused by C4 explosives molded into a shaped charge against the hull of the boat.

[7] Much of the blast entered a mechanical space below the ship's galley, violently pushing up the deck, thereby killing crew members who were lining up for lunch.

The first naval ship on the scene to assist the stricken Cole was HMS Marlborough, a Type 23 frigate of the Royal Navy, under the command of Captain Anthony Rix.

Marlborough had full medical and damage control teams on board, and when her offer of assistance was accepted she immediately diverted to Aden.

Both forces landed a few hours after the ship was struck and were reinforced by a U.S Marine platoon with the 1st Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team Company (FAST), based out of Norfolk, Virginia.

Landing craft (LCU) from the amphibious assault ships provided daily runs from Tarawa with hot food and supplies, and ferried personnel to and from all other naval vessels supporting Cole.

After being granted "permission from the Yemeni government to fly back to shore," an agent said their helicopter took evasive action during the flight due to fears of shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.

[34] Al-Nashiri was one of the three "high-value detainees" the George W. Bush administration would acknowledge had been subjected to waterboarding and other "enhanced interrogation techniques."

In 2003, the U.S. Justice Department indicted two people who were believed to have been the last main co-conspirators who were still at large, Jamal Ahmad Mohammad Al Badawi and Fahd al-Quso.

[47] An al-Qaeda commander in Yemen also confirmed that another co-conspirator in the bombing, Abdul Mun'im Salim al-Fatahani, was killed in a U.S. drone strike on 31 January 2012.

[49] The destroyer's rules of engagement, as approved by the Pentagon, forbade guards to fire upon the small boat (which was not known to be loaded with explosives) without permission from Cole's captain or another officer.

Petty Officer Jennifer Kudrick said that if the sentries had fired on the suicide craft, "we would have gotten in more trouble for shooting two foreigners than losing seventeen American sailors.

"[51] On 19 January 2001, the U.S. Navy completed and released its Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation of the incident, concluding that Cole's commanding officer Commander Kirk Lippold "acted reasonably in adjusting his force protection posture based on his assessment of the situation that presented itself" when Cole arrived in Aden to refuel.

The JAGMAN investigation also concluded that "the commanding officer of Cole did not have the specific intelligence, focused training, appropriate equipment or on-scene security support to effectively prevent or deter such a determined, preplanned assault on his ship", and recommended significant changes in Navy procedures.

Then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice told the Commission that when the administration took office on 20 January 2001; "We knew that there was speculation that the 2000 Cole attack was al Qaeda.

"[55] One report stated that "six days after Bush took office", the FBI "believed they had clear evidence tying the bombers to Al Qaeda.

Former CIA Director George Tenet testified (page 196) that he "believed he laid out what was knowable early in the investigation, and that this evidence never really changed until after 9/11.

"[57] The report suggests (pages 201–202) that the official assessment was similarly vague until at least March 2001: On 25 January, Tenet briefed the President on the Cole investigation.

The written briefing repeated for top officials of the new administration what the CIA had told the Clinton White House in November.

The Navy stepped up Random Anti-Terrorism Measures (RAM), which are meant to complicate the planning of a terrorist contemplating an attack by making it difficult to discern a predictable pattern to security posture.

[60] On 3 November 2002, a CIA-operated Predator UAV fired an AGM-114 Hellfire missile at a vehicle in Yemen carrying Abu Ali al-Harithi, a suspected planner of the bombing plot.

Following his surrender, Yemeni authorities released him in return for a pledge not to engage in any violent or al-Qaeda-related activity, despite a US$5 million reward for his capture.

[67] In 2009, U.S. federal judge Kimba Wood released $13.4 million in frozen assets belonging to Sudan, to be awarded to 33 spouses, parents, and children of the sailors killed in the attack.

"[69] On 1 January 2019 Jamal al-Badawi, an al-Qaeda militant behind the attack, died in a U.S. air strike, President Donald Trump confirmed.

The Cole bombing plays a highly visible role in Navy damage-control training, which begins in boot camp with a pre-graduation Battle Stations event.

"The Cole Scenario", launched in 2007, takes place aboard a realistic destroyer mock-up housed at Naval Station Great Lakes, Illinois.

[72] On 13 February 2020, the Government of Sudan announced that it had reached an agreement to compensate the families of the USS Cole victims, a prerequisite for being removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

Its design originated as a vision of USS Cole crew members, who then teamed with Navy architects and the Society to finalize the project.