United Kingdom and the League of Nations
The United Kingdom and the League of Nations played central roles in the diplomatic history of the interwar period 1920-1939 and the search for peace.
[2] From 1931 onward, major aggressions by Japan, Italy, Spain and Germany effectively ruined the League in British eyes.
[3] Before the 1919 Paris Peace Conference in 1919, much work had been put into finding a suitable candidate for secretary-general of the newly-established League of Nations.
Cecil, who played a key role in drafting the Covenant and organising the League, initially wanted a person with a background in politics for the post; there were several suitable candidates, but none accepted his proposal.
However, after it transpired that the office holder would not be given as many powers as initially thought, Cecil reconsidered and sought to find somebody who was a well-trained civil servant and less known as a big political figure.
He first approached Maurice Hankey, who for some time showed interest in the position but in the end rejected the offer only ten days before the Paris plenary session.
[citation needed] After some initial doubt in which Drummond expressed anxiety about organising the League, he finally accepted the proposal.
No such thing had ever been attempted, and prewar secretariats had largely been confined to the national sphere as regards who supplied them and the civil servants who worked there.
The creation of an international civil service was problematic, and administrative leaders thought it unthinkable that such a body would ever be united, loyal or efficient.
He took great care to maintain world peace, as was hoped during the creation of the League, but he also appeased nations, rather than keeping them in check against international law.
[9] The ideal underpinning the secretariat and those working there was one much resembling a Weberian understanding of bureaucracy, the idea of a non-political, neutral, effective and efficient bureaucrat.
The League of Nations' Council relied on the willingness of its members to use their militaries to apply its collective security mandate during crises.
Drummond was unable to give a public condemnation of Mussolini's policies, as he had the backing of neither Britain nor France and wanted to maintain good relations with Italy.
[19] When the crisis reached its peak, Stimson advised Drummond to "strengthen and support treaty obligations" the Japanese action had caused British discomfort.
British public opinion was generally favorable toward the League, providing its major basis of popular and financial support.
David Lloyd George, prime Minister until 1922, believed that the League without the United States was a member was a worthless and probably dangerous organization.
[28] According to B. J. C. McKercher, LNU had considerable success in leading the mainstream of British society to its cause, including labour, the churches and the principal newspapers.
[30] The three main leaders were Gilbert Murray (an Oxford professor), Lord Robert Cecil (who helped Woodrow Wilson design the League of Nations Covenant in 1919), and the general secretary, J. C. Maxwell Garnett.
More than eleven million people participated in it, representing strong support for the aims and objectives of the League of Nations, influencing policy makers and politicians.
It provided publications, films, speakers and lesson plans that were endorsed by Local Education Authorities, and the National Union of Teachers.
Brian J. Elliott shows the material downplayed simple moralism, criticized narrow nationalism and gave historical studies a broad European perspective.
[34] The Conference consisted of ambassadors of the United States Great Britain, Italy, and Japan accredited in Paris and French minister of foreign affairs.
[4] After extensive debate on the question of admitting Albania and Bulgaria, Lord Cecil proved most convincing, and secured their admission in late 1920.
The 1925 Locarno agreement enabled German admission, but there were further delays caused by a crisis over giving a permanent seat on the Council to Spain or Brazil.
In the context of Europe in the 1920s, the fear was that Germany could quickly rearm, threaten the neighbor, and the disarmed members of the League would be helpless to stop it.
Finally in September 1923 a French draft retitled the "Treaty of Mutual Assistance" was supported by majority, with a large dissenting minority.
The new version would empower the Consul to designate an aggressor, apply economic sanctions, mobilize military forces, and supervise their action.
The death blow for the proposed treaty came in Geneva on 4 September 1924 when Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald rejected it and called instead for a system of arbitrating disputes.
[4][38][39][40] The idea of a military force for an international organization was more than 20 years away from becoming a reality in 1924, but became a function of the League's replacement, the United Nations.
[41] The "Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes" was a proposal by British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and his French counterpart Édouard Herriot.
