[2] Its activities were meant to aid the peace process between the Hutu-dominated Rwandese government and the Tutsi-dominated rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

The UNAMIR has received much attention for its role in failing, due to the limitations of its rules of engagement, to prevent the Rwandan genocide and outbreak of fighting.

It portrayed itself as a democratic, multi-ethnic movement and demanded an end to ethnic discrimination, to economic looting of the country by government elites and a stop to the security situation that continued to generate refugees.

[4] Comparing the RPF and FAR as he saw them in 1993, Canadian Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire noted that the rebels "had won all recent contests because of their superior leadership, training, experience, frugality, mobility, discipline and morale.

The Tutsi civilians in Rwanda, roughly 14% of the population, were labelled ibyitso ("accomplices") or inyenzi ("cockroaches"), who were accused of secretly aiding the RPF invaders.

[6] Anti-Tutsi propaganda was spread through the publication Kangura, a forerunner to the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, which was created immediately after the invasion.

The first plans for mass murder of Tutsi were also developed toward the end of 1990, mostly in a series of secret meetings in Gisenyi prefecture of the Akazu, a network of associates based around Agathe Habyarimana, the First Lady.

Squabbling between interested parties delayed the UNAMIR goal of assisting the formation of the transitional government following the inauguration of President Habyarimana on 5 January 1994.

UNAMIR thus contributed support to the military and civilian authorities in Rwanda, while the UN continued to place pressure on Habyarimana and the RPF to return to the ideas set forth in the Accords.

Among the first targets of the genocide were Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and ten Belgian members of 2nd Commando Battalion, the Paracommando Regiment operating as part of UNAMIR.

[28] UNAMIR's Chapter VI mandate rendered it powerless to intervene militarily,[29] and most of its Rwandan staff were killed in the early days of the genocide, severely limiting its ability to operate.

[32] On 12 April, the Belgian government, which was one of the largest troop contributors to UNAMIR,[33] and had lost ten soldiers protecting Prime Minister Uwilingiliyimana, announced that it was withdrawing.

[36] According to Philip Gourevitch, the United States, having recently suffered losses in the UN mission in Somalia, was particularly keen to "get out of Rwanda" and "leave it to its fate".

[40] The new soldiers did not start arriving until June,[41] and following the end of the genocide in July, the role of UNAMIR II was largely confined to maintaining security and stability.

[43] Unfortunately, in the face of the mayhem in Rwanda and this diplomatic watering down of UNAMIR's mandate, many UN member states delayed contributing personnel for some time, until the main wave of killings ceased.

Following the end of the main killings the challenges for UNAMIR (and the many NGOs who arrived in the country) were to maintain the fragile peace, stabilise the government and, most importantly, care for the nearly 4 million displaced people in camps within Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda.

The massive camps around Lake Kivu in the northwest of Rwanda were holding about 1.2 million people and this was creating enormous security, health, and ecological problems.

Countries that contributed troops to UNAMIR throughout its existence were: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, India, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

In 2004–2005, he was awarded a fellowship at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University, where he was studying and writing about different forms of conflict resolution.

On 25 March 2005, he was appointed a Canadian senator, representing Québec as a member of the Liberal Party of Canada; he serves on the committee for Human Rights.