[20] UNOSOM II faced heavy criticism for alleged human rights abuses, violations of international law, and the use of excessive force, attracting scrutiny from a wide range of humanitarian organizations, academics and journalists.

[15] According to UNOSOM II advisor John Drysdale the majority of Somali political leaders rejected the notion of UN administering any aspect of Somalia, though some prominent figures such as Gen. Mohamed Abshir called for the return of trusteeship.

In Drysdale's view UNITAF had avoided armed conflict with Somali factions due to the careful rules of engagement created by the head of the operation, US Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston.

[43] In addition to this the representative of the UN Secretary-General in Somalia, retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe, staffed the UNOSOM II headquarters with twenty-eight US officers in key positions.

[citation needed] Major disagreements between the UN and the Somali National Alliance began soon after the establishment of UNOSOM II, centering on the perceived true nature of the operations political mandate.

During the March Addis Ababa conference, the Somali National Front (SNF), a pro-Barre faction opposing Aidid, smuggled weapons into the strategic port city of Kismayo.

Most notably during a visit to Hargeisa, Leonard Kamungo, the head of the Political Affairs division for UNOSOM II, engaged in discussions with the President of Somaliland, Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal.

[53][54] Radio Mogadishu was a highly popular broadcast station with the residents of the city, and was a vital piece of SNA infrastructure that had been captured following a vicious battle with Ali Mahdi's forces.

[36] According to the 1994 United Nations Inquiry: Opinions differ, even among UNOSOM officials, on whether the weapons inspections of 5 June 1993 was genuine or was merely a cover-up for reconnaissance and subsequent seizure of Radio Mogadishu.

[56]On the morning of Saturday June 5, 1993 an element of the Pakistani force in Somalia had been tasked with the inspection of site AWSS 5, which happened to be located at Aidid controlled Radio Mogadishu.

[76]In the week after the offensive, US officers and intelligence experts contended that Aidid's command and control capability over his SNA fighters had been significantly weakened, and the organization's morale had taken a substantial hit.

However, interviews conducted by the Washington Post with Somali insurgents painted a contrasting picture: a highly motivated and committed military force whose morale seemed to strengthen as the conflict intensified.

He would argue that, "[There is] a distinctive mindset and approach to low-intensity operations which had been shaped by the American experience during and after Vietnam, and by a deeply entrenched belief in the efficacy of technology and firepower as a means of minimizing one’s own casualties.

[85][86] The backlash from Somali political and military factions against the offensive was so profound that even groups previously ambivalent or antagonistic towards Aidid began to perceive the UN and US forces as foreign oppressors.

[95] Notable groups and organizations such as the Vatican, the Organisation of African Unity, World Vision, Doctors Without Borders, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International called for UNOSOM to review it policies and course.

[103] Further criticism of the raid came from numerous contributing states such as Ireland, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe,[44] but most notably the Italian contingent, who threatened to pull out of the whole operation a few days later citing concerns that the escalation was indicative that relief role of UNOSOM II had been overtaken by an American-led campaign against Mohammed Farah Aidid.

[104][105][106][107] The Italians, who had ruled Somalia as a colonial territory for half a century, believed that the unprecedented attack threatened to widen the civil war and turn the Somalis against the entire UN peacekeeping force.

[100] American envoy to Somalia, Robert B. Oakley, stated that after the raid countries such as Italy, France, and Zimbabwe, as well as other UNOSOM contingents, ceased their participation in operations against Aidid upon receiving orders from their respective governments.

[112][113][114] At least nine UN civilian employees in Mogadishu working for the humanitarian sector either resigned or walked away from their posts in protest, including the top UNOSOM Justice Division official in Somalia, Ann Wright.

This shift was signalled by Defense Secretary Les Aspin in his 27 August speech, advocating for a decreased military focus in UNOSOM II and urging the UN and the OAU to resume negotiations with all parties.

[19][129] After the cessation of hostilities between the SNA and UNOSOM, Acting Special Representative Lansana Kouyate (replacing Adm. Johnathan Howe) successfully launched an initiative to normalize relations in March 1994.

[132] On November 4, 1994, after peacemaking efforts by the remaining 1,900 UNOSOM II troops failed, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously to withdraw all forces in Resolution 954.

A three-man UN inquiry commission headed by Matthew Nglube, former chief justice of Zambia, Gen. Emmanuel Erskine of Ghana and Gen. Gustav Hagglund of Finland was set up by the Security Council.

[14] The day after the Battle of Mogadishu, after being asked by journalists on national news if Malaysia disagreed with any UNOSOM policies, Defence Minister Najib Razak would comment: "We find there is too much emphasis on military action, like it was an obsession.

[25][149] While conceding UN troops were in a difficult position, the Africa Rights Watch report would conclude that abuses and atrocities carried out by UNOSOM II force stemmed from the highest echelons of the command structure and were not cases of undisciplined actions by individual soldiers.

"[156] In one incident noted by both Aidan Hartley and Ramesh Thakur, an American AH-1 Cobra helicopter launched a missile strike into Mogadishu in front of a large crowd of Somalis and foreign correspondents.

"[46] A 1995 Amnesty International report would conclude that the operation had demonstrated a poor record of promoting and protecting human rights, which would consequently severely impede its ability to function.

[18] UNOSOM II’s complete departure in early 1995 did not result in the eruption of violence that was widely predicted, though the civil war continued to simmer with occasional clashes between factions.

"[162] In the view of Walter Clarke, a high ranking US official involved in Operation Restore Hope, and Jeffrey Herbst, Associate Professor at Princeton University, "The intervention in Somalia was not an abject failure; an estimated 100,000 lives were saved.

[165][150] Charles W. Maynes, an American diplomat and editor of Foreign Policy, reported that according to private estimates by CIA officials, U.S. troops alone may have been responsible for between 7,000 and 10,000 Somali casualties.