Germany provided significant investment and its diplomats gained more influence at British expense, previously the predominant power in the region and German officers assisted in training and re-equipping the army.

[7] On 30 July 1914, two days after the outbreak of the war in Europe, the Ottoman leaders agreed to form the Ottoman-German Alliance in secret against Russia, although it did not require them to undertake military action.

The Allies conducted the Pursuit of Goeben and Breslau which escaped, when the Ottoman government opened the Dardanelles to allow them to sail to Constantinople, despite being required under international law, as a neutral party, to block military shipping.

[14] On 27 October, Goeben and Breslau, having been renamed Yavûz Sultân Selîm and Midilli, sortied into the Black Sea, bombarded the port of Odessa and sank several Russian ships.

[24] Later that month, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, proposed a naval attack on the Dardanelles, based in part on erroneous reports of Ottoman troop strength.

[27] On 24 March, Enver Pasha the Ottoman Minister of War unified the military forces around the Dardanelles, under the command of Marshal Otto Liman von Sanders and the Fifth Army headquarters.

The Ottomans had entrenched and wired the plateau and extended the fortifications south to Kakma Dagh ridge on the Straits and north to Gaba Tepe, forming a defensive line where the peninsula was 5 miles (8.0 km) wide and which dominated the Kilia plain to the south-west.

The Royal Naval Division (RND) less two battalions, was to make a demonstration at the narrowest point of the peninsula, to induce the Ottomans to retain forces in the area during the main landings.

[48] The Ottoman defenders had an advantage in fighting from prepared positions, in the absence of surprise or accurate covering fire from the ships but experienced problems with communication and found that the artillery was out of range of the beach.

The ridge beyond the centre of the beach was commanded by entrenchments on higher ground to the north-east and south-west and 600 yards (550 m) away lay one of two redoubts close to Hill 138, both extensively wired and behind slopes with no cover.

Ottoman small-arms fire against the main landing began to diminish after a trench was hit by heavy shells from offshore; the Fusiliers cut more paths through the wire and attacked the cliff at the south end of the beach.

On the northern flank, Hill 114 was consolidated but an advance to the second objective from W Beach was not made and despite outnumbering the Ottoman troops 6:1, the British awaited fresh orders, which were not forthcoming, due to the loss of the commander of the landing force and the difficulties in communication with the headquarters staffs still afloat.

The landing party of three companies of the 2nd Battalion, South Wales Borderers covered by the battleship Cornwallis made landfall under fire from the Ottoman platoon in a trench half-way up the cliff.

The landing party had reached the shore and climbed to the top of the cliff with no casualties by 6:30 a.m. when the tows returned to collect the rest of the battalion and equipment, which had arrived by 7:30 a.m. As the British pushed inland, they came close to a locality where two Ottoman reserve companies were bivouacked.

The initial landing party was not under the command of Brigadier-General W. R. Marshall and the main force had no instructions, to participate in its second phase advance to a line from Y Beach to Sedd el Bahr.

The sea at the shore was deep enough for boats to sail within a few yards and the coast was a steep cliff about 150 feet (46 m) high, with two gullies giving easy access to the top.

The landing force waited until mid-afternoon for the expected advance from Cape Helles, in conditions so quiet, that Matthews and an adjutant crossed Gully Ravine and walked to within 500 yards (460 m) of Krithia and found no sign of Ottoman troops.

A few minutes later Matthews signalled that the ships should fire 1,000 yards (910 m) beyond the cliff edge, onto Ottoman troops who were massing for another attack, which began at 7:00 a.m. and broke through the centre of the British line.

During the departure, no gunfire was received from the Ottoman troops in the vicinity and when a naval officer led a party of marines ashore in the afternoon to look for survivors, they were able to search the area for an hour without interference.

During the night, Lieutenant-Commander B. C. Freyberg swam ashore and lit flares along the beach, crept inland and observed the Ottoman defences, which he found to be dummies, returning safely.

[73] After the landings, the Ottoman commander, General Weber Pasha, was criticised for being caught unprepared, poor tactics, communication failures and leadership, although the flat terrain had made accurate bombardment from offshore much easier.

The Ottoman garrison was detained in the area until 27 April, although the Turkish Official Account recorded that the landings at Kum Kale and the demonstration at Besika Bay had been recognised as ruses.

Hunter-Weston concentrated on the landings at V and W beaches and later on Hill 138, which was consistent with the tendency of generals on the Western Front to dwell on areas where enemy resistance was strongest and to reinforce failure.

[78] In 1929, C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, the British Official Historian wrote that in the course of the Gallipoli campaign, the MEF failed to reach its first day objectives but that the plan to advance to Achi Baba had a reasonable chance of success.

The obvious difficulties of moving troops in open boats by instalments had been distracting, particularly the moments between disembarkation and reaching the shore, despite the confidence of the navy in its plans for bombardment.

Oglander suggested that a separate communications vessel should have been prepared for the army and navy staffs, equipped with signalling apparatus to maintain touch with the landing forces, free from other demands for its services.

[81] The stress and exhaustion of the landings and the unknown nature of the environment ashore combined with officer casualties left some of the units of the 29th Division to be in great difficulty by the afternoon, unaware that the Ottoman defenders were in an equally demoralised state.

Before the invasion Hunter-Weston had printed a "Personal Note" to each soldier in the division to explain the hazards of the landing as a forewarning, writing of Heavy losses by bullets, by shells, by "mines" and by drowning....to which the troops would be exposed.

The Ottoman defenders were too few to defeat the invasion but the leadership of Sami Bey, who sent the few reinforcements available to the 26th Regiment, gave orders to drive the British into the sea, a simple instruction which all could understand.

[83] Oglander wrote that the Turkish Official Account recorded 1,898 Ottoman casualties, from the five battalions south of Achi Baba before morning on 27 April, in the first two days of the landings at Cape Helles.