[10] In Benson v. United States (1892), the Supreme Court explained the underlying common law theory for this prohibition; namely, that only witnesses who were "unaffected as a party by the result, and free from any of the temptations of interest" could testify.

[16] The Court initially rejected an argument that the Due Process Clause applied to the state governments in Hurtado v. California (1884), a case concerning the right to a grand jury hearing.

[17] Justice Matthews, writing for the majority of the Court, reasoned that "the Amendment prescribing due process of law is too vague and indefinite to operate as a practical restraint.

[20][21] In finding that application of the Due Process Clause, the Court said that just compensation constituted "a vital principle of republican institutions [without which] almost all other rights would become worthless".

[22] In the same year as the railroad takings case, the Court evaluated what procedural trial rights implicated the "fundamental principles of liberty" expressed in Hurtado.

[33] In the realm of criminal procedure, this doctrine eventually came to protect the defendant's ability to "present exculpatory evidence and testimony of witnesses".

[34] For example, the Court in Brady v. Maryland (1963) used the Due Process Clause to require the state prosecution authorities to disclose evidence that is favorable to a defendant prior to trial.

[43] The Court of Criminal Appeals, which reasoned that the Compulsory Process Clause did not affect how the state treated the "competency" of a witness, rejected Washington's plea that Fuller should have been allowed to testify.

[12] Despite the common law restriction against co-defendants testifying for each other, Warren noted that federal courts had refused to be "bound by 'the dead hand of the common-law'" since 1918.

[12] Warren concluded that the nature of the Texas law at issue denied Washington the right for a fair trial using witnesses who could testify to "relevant and material" facts in the case.

[50] Here, while not entirely relying on the finding,[51] the Court saw the law as "arbitrary" because its discrimination between the prosecution and defense served "no rational relationship" to any goal of preventing perjury.

[54] Despite adopting a broad principle, the Court did not list any specific rules for how trial judges were to balance evidentiary standards and the right of the defendant to secure witnesses in his or her favor.

[55] Justice Harlan, who agreed with the decision to reverse the Texas court's judgment but not with the majority's reasoning, wrote a short separate concurring opinion.

[60][61] Additionally, in Taylor v. Illinois (1988), the Court held that "countervailing public interests" could also outweigh the defendant's compulsory process rights.

[62] A divided Court upheld the trial judge's preclusion of the witness, adding a new framework for balancing a defendant's right to a robust defense with a series of other factors.

[65] This line of decisions, Hewett argued, led to a standard which allows a trial judge the authority to determine the "actual reliability of the evidence" in cases where a witness is not present.

Kime argued that "it is well settled that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to present exculpatory evidence", disagreeing with the idea that the basis for a robust defense had been gutted.

[73] Kime's analysis concluded by stating that the decision in Washington had put "unnecessary tension between two analytically distinct constitutional rights".