Xi'an Incident
Before the incident, Chiang Kai-shek had followed a public strategy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" that entailed eliminating the CCP before confronting Japanese aggression.
This strategy was deeply unpopular among many groups in China, including the Northeastern Army tasked with suppressing the main Communist base in Yan'an.
[1] Unaware of these developments, the commanders of the Northeastern Army, generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, hatched an independent conspiracy to kidnap Chiang.
Combined with the mobilization of an expeditionary force by He Yingqin to attack Xi'an, the Communists and Zhang Xueling were pressured into creating a United Front under Chiang's leadership.
[3] The Nationalists found it difficult to organize an effective suppression campaign, in part because many of their armies answered to a local warlord rather than to the central government.
[9] Wang Ming, the CCP's representative to the Comintern, began to call for a united anti-Japanese front that would include patriots within the KMT.
[20] But Stalin was eager to counter Japanese expansionism, and once he was convinced that Chiang was not trying to drag him into a war against Japan, the Soviets began to come around to the idea of a Chinese united front.
[23] The Comintern sent the CCP a series of telegrams over the summer directing them to focus on forming a united front with the Nationalist Government, while agreeing that the Red Army should not be subsumed into a larger force.
This fear was not unfounded: in November, Chiang demanded that the Red Army be reduced to only 3,000 men, and that all officers above the division level resign and go into exile.
The Red Army treated their POWs well and gave them a political education, sending them back to spread the word that the Communists wanted to form an anti-Chiang and anti-Japanese alliance.
[32] Yang Hucheng had long tolerated the presence of Communists on his military staff, so with his officer Nan Hanchen acting as intermediary, he was able to conclude a cease-fire quickly.
[31] Zhang Xueliang was also interested in arranging a truce, but even though his senior staff was dominated by Communist sympathizers, no one in his army had active CCP contacts.
[39] Zhang urged Chiang Kai-shek to reverse the policy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance", and focus on military preparation against Japan.
[42] Despite warnings from close friends like H. H. Kung of the dangers of the trip, Chiang chose to proceed, partly because his previous ventures into the territory of his adversaries had earned him a reputation for "fearlessness.
These included an immediate end to civil war against the CCP, expulsion of pro-Japanese factions from the Nationalist government, and the adoption of an active anti-Japanese military stance.
[46][40] News of the abduction spawned a wave of "extraordinarily widespread" popular support for Chiang Kai-Shek, according to an American diplomat.
[48] The Military Affairs Commission, led by He Yingqin, threatened to launch a direct attack on Xi'an to rescue Chiang, and immediately sent a regiment to capture the pass in Tongguan.
[49] American journalist James Bertram recalled feeling how another civil war was about to break out, and personally observed fleets of government aircraft flying low over the roofs of Xi'an.
'"[50] By mid-December, Nationalist aircraft were bombing the railway line through the Shaanxi mountains, accompanied by a spearhead of several elite divisions from the Central Army.
Similarly, a faction of the Northeastern Army led by Yang Hucheng and the radical young officers of the "Anti-Japanese Comrade Society" wanted to execute Chiang.
[47] Fearing a possible two-front war with both the Nazis and the Japanese, and potentially a pro-Japanese China in support, Stalin ordered that the CCP settle its disagreement with Chiang peacefully and release him alive.
At first, Chiang refused to formally agree to any demands while held a captive, and appeared fully prepared to accept death rather than submission.
This changed when Zhou Enlai, who Chiang had been in secret negotiations with since the summer of that year, arrived in Xi'an on December 16 to represent the CCP.
[47] To the public, it seemed as if Chiang had been compelled into an alliance against the Japanese, but in reality the terms of the arrangement were almost identical to those agreed upon in secret before the kidnapping took place.
He observed that the Xi'an crisis "fostered another spontaneous outburst of nationalism throughout the country and caused universal rejoicing when the Generalissimo was released on Christmas Day.
Yang Hucheng and the Anti-Japanese Comrade Society wanted to stand and fight if the KMT army attacked, and refuse to negotiate until Zhang was released.
The Communist representatives strongly disagreed and cautioned that civil war would, in the words of Zhou Enlai, "make China into another Spain".
However, when a conference of Northeastern officers in January 1937 overwhelmingly resolved not to surrender peacefully, the CCP reluctantly decided that they could not abandon their allies and pledged to fight alongside them if the KMT attacked.
Chiang's leadership over political and military affairs in China was affirmed, while the CCP was able to expand its own strength under the new united front, which played a role in the Chinese Communist Revolution.
[67] In present day China, Zhang Xueliang is portrayed as a patriot who was shocked by Chiang's unwillingness to face the looming threat of Japan, rather focusing on fighting his fellow Chinese.
