[94] Wang Shida of China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations linked the current border tensions to India's decision to abrogate Article 370 and change the status of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019.

Liu Zongyi, a South Asia specialist at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies told the Financial Times that "India has been active in many of US plans that target China".

[d][112][113] During late July and early August, reports emerged of PLA strengthening positions and accumulating troops at more locations other than Ladakh such as Uttarakhand's Lipulekh Pass, parts of north Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh.

[117] On 5 May, the first standoff began as a clash between Indian[g] and Chinese soldiers at a beach of Pangong Tso, a lake shared between India and Tibet, China, with the Line of Actual Control (LAC) passing through it.

[132] By 27 June, China was reported to have increased military presence on both the northern and southern banks of Pangong Tso, strengthened their positions near Finger 4 (contrary to what the status quo was in April), and had even started construction of a helipad, bunkers and pillboxes.

[133] Satellite imagery from between 12 and 26 June, by Planet Labs shows that the Chinese army increased infrastructure between Finger 4 and 5 on a massive scale, which includes tents, trenches, water tanks and stationed equipment and vehicles along with some camouflaged structures.

[201] On 16 June, Chinese Colonel Zhang Shuili, spokesperson for the PLA's Western Command, said that the Indian military violated bilateral consensus causing "fierce physical confrontations and casualties",[202] and that "the sovereignty over the Galwan Valley area had always belonged to China".

[276] The People's Daily reported that the PLA has been constructing new infrastructure for the winter, such as pre-fabricated shelters, and conducting drills using drones to deliver hot meals to frontline troops.

[279] Commentators are pointing out that this is becoming or has already become a war of attrition;[280] this includes Yun Sun, a China specialist at the Stimson Center,[281] and Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor of Chinese studies at JNU.

[307] On 17 June 2020, Prime Minister Modi addressed the nation regarding the Galwan skirmish, giving a firm message directed at China over the deaths of Indian soldiers.

Upon seeing that the page said that the content had been deleted by the author, the Indian embassy in China issued a clarification that the post wasn't removed by them, and re-published a screenshot of the statement in Chinese.

[59] Chinese spokesperson, Zhao Lijian said that India "agreed to and withdrew its cross-border personnel in the Galwan Valley and dismantled the crossing facilities in accordance with China's request".

[59][341] The third round of commanders' talks were held on 30 June;[318][319] India reiterated its demand for the pullback of the Chinese troops from all key areas including Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley and the Depsang plains and the restoration of status quo ante in April whereas China emphasised that the military buildup in the region should be reduced.

[343] After earlier unsuccessful attempts at complete disengagement, a discussion scheduled for 5 July, was held between special representatives National Security Advisor of India, Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister of China, Wang Yi, where it was decided that both Indian and Chinese troops would move back 1.8 km from the patrolling point PP 14, the 15 June clash site in the Galwan valley.

[356][357] On day 100 of the border tensions The Week reported a statement from a defence official based in the Secretariat Building in New Delhi, "Indian military planners believe that things seem to be out of their control.

[358] Chinese General Wei Fenghe and his Indian counterpart Rajnath Singh held a talk, on 4 September in Moscow, on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting.

[370] On 4 August, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said that the two countries should "make sure differences do not escalate into disputes" and that China hopes India will work with them in maintaining the "overall interests of bilateral relations.

"[376][377] On 15 September 2020, in the Parliament of India, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said "China made transgression attempts on Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the western sector.

[409] Following the Galwan clash, Chinese flags and effigies of paramount leader Xi Jinping were burned in various places across India and various groups registered their protests in different ways.

[433] Initially, India's economic response to China was mainly restricted to patriotic programs on news channels and social media publicity appeals, with very little actual impact on businesses and sales.

[458] The Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade brought out a list of over 1000 Made in China goods on which the Government of India has sought comments for imposing import restrictions.

[497] On 6 September, the Hindustan Times reported that social media posts were being shared of how locals from Chushul and Merak villages are helping to supply water and other essential to the Indian Army, including front-line areas such as Black Top.

[499] On 17 June, following the Galwan clash, former chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Omar Abdullah tweeted, "Those Kashmiris tempted to look towards China as some sort of saviour need only google the plight of Uighur Muslims.

[500] Khalid Shah, an Associate fellow at ORF, writes that at large the Kashmiri population has "left no stone unturned to mock the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi for the Chinese belligerence.

[508] Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary Xi Jinping was reported to be under no public pressure to respond to the border tensions with India, even after the Galwan incident.

[509] Reuters reported that "Beijing's response also points to its interest in de-escalating a crisis over a stretch of border that is less politically important than other territorial priorities, such as claims to Taiwan and the South China Sea".

[509] Long Xingchun, a senior research fellow at the Beijing Foreign Studies University, wrote on 25 May that "unlike previous standoffs, the latest border friction was not caused by accident, but was a planned move of New Delhi.

[516] In an interview to The Guardian, Cai Xia, expelled from the CCP on 17 August 2020, said that the recent India-China border clash and "provoking conflict" elsewhere was part of Xi's way to "divert the attention of the Chinese public" from "domestic economic and social tensions" as well as "to consolidate his own position and authority".

[519] Liu Zongyi, the secretary-general of the Research Centre for China-South Asia Cooperation at Shanghai Institute of International Studies, in an interview on 21 September 2020, said that the Indian Army is nibbling away at Chinese land.

[177] The Global Times quoted Lin Minwang, a professor at Fudan University's Center for South Asian Studies in Shanghai, as saying that "Modi's remarks will be very helpful to ease the tensions because as the Prime Minister of India, he has removed the moral basis for hardliners to further accuse China".