The popularity he had gained in Messina, his homeland, prompted him to pursue a political career upon his return to Italy after the end of the war; in 1913 he ran as an independent candidate, with a nationalist and anti-Giolittian program, and was elected to the Italian Chamber of Deputies, being later re-elected in the XXIV, XXV and XXVII legislatures.

[7][8][9][10] In parliament, Di Giorgio mostly dealt with problems of military nature; he argued the need to shift the center of gravity of the Italian armed forces from the north to the south of the country, and from the land to the sea.

Such positions had as a military rationale the new role that Italy should have assumed in the Mediterranean in relation to the acquisition of Libya; as well as the need to provide economic support to the disadvantaged areas of the country, with particular emphasis on those of Messina, which still suffered from the destructive consequences of the 1908 earthquake, in which he had lost his father.

Di Giorgio led his troops against the tide of the stream of stragglers who retreated from Caporetto, and his men held the Austro-Hungarians at bay from 26 October to 3 November in Battle of Ragogna, until the Corps was almost completely destroyed.

Di Giorgio was then promoted to lieutenant general and replaced Pietro Badoglio in command of the XXVII Corps (Reggio, Campania, Cuneo and Messina infantry brigades).

[17][18][19] After the end of the war he returned to political life, and in the following years he supported the annexation of Fiume by Italy, albeit siding against D'Annunzio's occupation of the city, which he saw as a symptom of declining discipline in the Army.

Mussolini, who saw him as a general both appreciated by the Army and the king and favourable towards Fascism, immediately appointed him Minister of War, replacing Armando Diaz, whose health was deteriorating.

In Di Giorgio's view, this sizeable reduction of the peacetime army would not negatively impact its readiness and would enable to spare funds that would then be used to improve the armament and equipment.

Di Giorgio's ideas, however, were not appreciated by the regime, committed to propagating the need for an extensive militarization of the Italian people; the High Council of the Army (composed of the Duke of Aosta, Luca Montuori, Enrico Caviglia, Giulio Cesare Tassoni, Gaetano Giardino, Carlo Petitti di Roreto and Giuseppe Francesco Ferrari) rejected the reform, which also entailed a reduction of the powers of the High Council of the Army in favour of the Chief of Staff, and Generals Luigi Cadorna, Gaetano Giardino, Enrico Caviglia, Vittorio Zupelli and Giulio Cesare Tassoni and Admiral Paolo Thaon di Revel all harshly opposed the proposal in parliament.