The expedition was opposed by only a bit over thousand French troops led by Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, in his only ever field command.

Aiming to support Maréchal de Noailles in the capture of Barcelona and to force Spain to sign a peace treaty, Tourville sailed out of Brest on 24 April with 71 ships of the line and Chateaurenault's squadron followed him on 7 May.

[3] Informed of this fact, the English and Dutch planned to take Brest, thinking that this would be easy in the absence of Tourville and his fleet, and to land a strong army of occupation there of 7,000 to 8,000 men.

After Tourville's victory at Lagos in 1693, William III of England had sent an expedition to take reprisals against Saint-Malo and planned to mount other similar operations against other French ports.

[8] Of his first stay at Camaret, Vauban wrote in his memoir of 9 May 1685: There are still two roadsteads outside the Goulet of Brest which serve as a vestibule to this entrance, of which one (known as Berthaume) is prepared against all the winds from the north, and that of Cameret against all those of Le Midy, both being well-held.

But there is a little merchant port at a corner of that at Camaret with bays where pirates withdraw with impunity, which happens often in course of war or bad weather : this is why it should be necessary to here make a battery of four or five guns supported by a tower and a small masonry enclosure to stop them and to hold a net over this roadstead that, in this way, would become an assured refuge for the good of merchant vessels that are forced in by bad weather more often than they are at risk of being capturedJust after the war began and, having inspected the sites already, he decided first to set up a defensive position at Bertheaume and to build a "tour de côte" at Camaret, the unique example of its type.

When in 1691 sixteen Anglo-Dutch vessels were sighted in Camaret Bay, five French frigates happened to be present and routed the enemy fleet.

[3][11] In the face of more and more precise English threats, Louis XIV made Vauban "supreme commander of all French land and sea forces in the province of Brittany".

In mid-June he inspected the defences under his command and noted that the baie de Douarnenez and above all Camaret would allow landings by large numbers of troops.

[14] Aiming to prevent any landings, and with no warships at his disposal, he equipped scores of chaloupes to defend the goulet and armed militias with weapons requisitioned by the navy.

The cavalry regiments and dragoons were positioned at Landerneau and Quimper and, to enable the fast transmission of information, Vauban organised a communications code in the form of signals.

[15] In a letter to Louis XIV on 17 June 1694, he reported: I arrived yesterday evening on the coast at Camaret and its environs around the bay of Douarnenez.

Rear admiral the Marquess of Carmarthen (accompanied by John Cutts) approached the coasts to check on the French positions and possible landing places.

[2] Unknown to the English, at this point the promised French reinforcements had still not arrived and Vauban wrote the following letter to the king at 11pm on 17 June: ...when, around 10pm, we heard signals from Ushant, marking that a large fleet had been sighted.

[3] On the morning of 18 June, a thick fog settled over this part of Brittany, blinding both sides and leading the English to postpone the attack.

This aided the French "for a cavalry corps commanded by Monsieur de Cervon and part of the militia only arrived at Châteaulin at 9 o'clock".

[3] Thus it was only at around 11 o'clock, when the fog lifted, that Carmarthen could advance with eight ships to attack the Tour de Camaret and protect the 200 longboats loaded with soldiers heading for the beach at Trez-Rouz.

But Talmash was so completely possessed by the notion that the French were not prepared to repel an attack that he disregarded all cautions and would not even trust his own eyes.

The French counter-attack repulsed the enemy back to the sea, and the landing troops were unable to retreat further since the falling tide had left the longboats high and dry.

The nearest cliff to where Talmash landed, or the battery which fired the shot that hit him, is still known as Maro ar saozon (the Englishman's death).

After this defeat, the Anglo-Dutch fleet put about and sailed back up the English Channel, bombarding ports such as Dieppe and Le Havre in reprisal.

[9] Searching for a scapegoat after this bloody defeat, many accused John Churchill, disgraced around this time by William III for other reasons, of treason.

[24] In the north transept of the parish church of Saint-Rémi, partly obscured by the organ pipes, there is a large stained-glass window showing the battle, designed by Jim Sévellec.