The Austrian army commander Dagobert von Würmser planned to march south-west from Bassano to Mantua, completing the clockwise manoeuvre.

This success allowed Bonaparte to follow Würmser down the Brenta valley to Bassano and, ultimately, trap him inside the walls of Mantua.

Lauer noted that the French army, "had suffered badly during the recent combats, and had not properly recovered, nor received significant reinforcements.

However, he drew some dangerous conclusions from this..." Lauer confidently predicted that the French army would remain quiet long enough for the Austrian relief effort to get well underway.

[6] Bonaparte instructed Sahuguet and General of Division Charles Kilmaine to leave a garrison in Peschiera del Garda and fall back behind the Oglio River if they were unable to resist an Austrian attack from the east.

[8] On 3 September, Masséna attacked 1,500 of Vukassovich's troops near Ala and drove them back to Marco on the east bank of the Adige.

Vaubois brushed aside some elements of Reuss's brigade at Nago-Torbole and stood poised to attack an Austrian position at Mori on the west bank.

[10] Davidovich placed Colonel Karl Weidenfeld and the Preiss Infantry Regiment 24 in a formidable position in the Adige gorge to cover the retreat of his forces.

Aided by artillery fire directed by General of Brigade Elzéar Auguste Cousin de Dommartin, Masséna's troops attacked in heavy columns and broke through.

Believing themselves well-covered by Weidenfeld's force, Vukassovich and Sporck allowed their troops to cook dinner when they arrived in Calliano.

[12][13] During the night, Davidovich evacuated Trento and fell back to Lavis, a village at the river Avisio and southern frontier of Austrian territory, where he joined Reuss.

[14] Far from retiring down the Adige with his whole army, Bonaparte ordered Vaubois to block the gorges north of Trent with 10,000 men, while the remaining 22,000 troops set off in full pursuit of Würmser down the same pass that the Austrians were using.

This was an extremely risky course to pursue, for during the operation the Army of Italy would be wholly dependent on what supplies it could seize locally, and even a temporary check on the Brenta might lead to starvation in the midst of the Alps.