Phú Cường, the capital of Bình Dương Province, was an important industrial and farming center and contained the ARVN Engineer School.

The surface was scarred by countless bomb and shell craters so that vehicular movement off the narrow, rough dirt roads was nearly impossible; even tracked vehicles had difficulty.

[3] Frequent sweeps and some semi-fixed defensive positions north of Củ Chi manned by the ARVN 25th Division and Hậu Nghĩa Province RF screened the western flank of the Triangle, but PAVN resistance in the Ho Bo Woods opposite Rach Bap and the formidable obstacle of the Saigon River, as well as a lack of resources, limited the influence that the 25th could exert on the situation within the Triangle.

[3] On 16 May the PAVN 9th Division began their attack on with heavy artillery, rocket, and mortar concentrations falling on Rach Bap, Base 82 and An Dien.

[3]: 101 The ARVN at Ben Cat were unable to counterattack the PAVN immediately at An Dien because the bridgehead held by the RF was too shallow to protect the crossing of any large forces, but III Corps commander Lieutenant general Phạm Quốc Thuần quickly began reinforcing Bến Cát.

Task Force 318 arrived in Bến Cát on the afternoon of the 16th and on the 17th began reinforcing the RF holding the bridge and moving against the PAVN's blocking positions west of the bridgehead.

Initial negative reactions at III Corps Headquarters to the seemingly hasty, if not unwarranted, withdrawal of the RF companies from their positions softened somewhat when the size and composition of the PAVN force was revealed.

[3]: 101 Thuần greatly underestimated the strength and tenacity with which the PAVN 9th Division would defend An Dien, although he had accurate intelligence concerning the size, composition, and location of his enemy.

About the same time, the 7th Ranger Group, with three battalions, moved southwest out of Lai Khê, crossed the Thi Thinh River and advanced on Base 82.

The Rangers were immediately opposed in the thick jungle and rubber plantation by entrenched PAVN 9th Division troops, and their attack stalled well short of the objective.

The North Vietnamese responded against ARVN batteries and the stalled Ranger and infantry columns and sent sappers into an RF command post just south of Bến Cát, where they destroyed a 105 mm howitzer and routed most of the small garrison.

By the 25th, the armored cavalry squadron had passed Suoi Cau without encountering any resistance, and another supporting maneuver began with two battalions of the 50th Infantry, 25th Division, moving north from Phú Hòa District along the west bank of the Saigon River.

The second phase of the Iron Triangle campaign was over with the recapture of An Dien, and Thuần was anxious to get the attack moving again toward Base 82 and Rach Bap.

[3]: 103 The first attempt to retake Base 82 began on 7 June 1974 when the 318th Task Force finally brought its tanks across the Thi Thinh River and passed through the 18th Division position in An Dien.

The 9th Division meanwhile began shifting the 272nd Regiment north from the southern part of the Iron Triangle to assist in the defense of Base 82 and Rach Bap.

[3]: 103 The summer monsoon had arrived in Bình Dương Province and rains and low cloud cover further reduced the effectiveness of RVNAF support for the attack.

A dense rubber plantation northwest of Base 82 provided excellent concealment for supporting defensive positions and observation of local Route 7, the only avenue of approach available for ARVN armor.

The only fairly open terrain was on either side or Route 7 where high grass offered no concealment to the ARVN column but reduced visibility to a few meters.

But on 10 June Task Force 318, advancing very slowly in two columns, one north of Route 7 and one south was struck by a battalion of the 271st Regiment supported by 4 tanks and a heavy concentration of mortar, howitzer and rocket fire.

[3]: 104 By 15 June, the two leading 43rd Infantry battalions, one of which was attempting to swing north of Base 82 from An Dien, had made very little headway against strong resistance and heavy PAVN artillery fire.

As the rain of PAVN shells continued, much of it heavy 120 mm mortars, the 8th kept digging and improving fighting positions with logs overhead.

But even if the 8th Infantry leaders on the scene could have held their troops in their exposed positions in front of Base 82, the regiment probably could not have survived the PAVN counterattack.

Before midnight on 3 October, as PAVN artillery and mortars were still firing heavy barrages, a 12-man assault team from the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, attempted to breach the barbed wire and scale the earthen wall.

This corps would soon direct the combat operations of the 7th and 9th Divisions, separate regiments, and additional formations already en route from North Vietnam.

III Corps Headquarters worked on plans to resume the attack to retake Rach Bap, the last outpost still remaining in PAVN hands.

But on 30 October, before the execution of the plan, President Thieu relieved Thuần of command of III Corps and replaced him with Lieutenant general Dư Quốc Đống.

Đống immediately surveyed the situation in the Iron Triangle and reviewed the plan of his predecessor, which as modified became Operation Quyet Thang 18/24 (Will to Victory).

Meanwhile, the 46th Infantry and one battalion of the 50th moved into the plantations north of Phú Hòa District Town to prevent PAVN infiltration across the Saigon River.

Along Route 7, the 9th Infantry advanced without incident until 19 November when sharp fighting west of Base 82 resulted in over 40 ARVN soldiers wounded.

The PAVN had given up its last foothold in the Iron Triangle with only token resistance in order to replace losses, reorganize, re-equip and retrain the main forces of the new 301st Corps for the decisive battles to come.