Civil control of the military

Use of the term in scholarly analyses tends to take place in the context of a democracy governed by elected officials, though the subordination of the military to political control is not unique to these societies.

As noted by University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill professor Richard H. Kohn, "civilian control is not a fact but a process".

[7] Affirmations of respect for the values of civil control notwithstanding, the actual level of control sought or achieved by the civil leadership may vary greatly in practice, from a statement of broad policy goals that military commanders are expected to translate into operational plans, to the direct selection of specific targets for attack on the part of governing politicians.

Richard Kohn, Professor Emeritus of History at UNC, summarises, "The point of civilian control is to make security subordinate to the larger purposes of a nation, rather than the other way around.

"[7]A state's effective use of force is an issue of great concern for all national leaders, who must rely on the military to supply this aspect of their authority.

A related danger is the use of the military to crush domestic political opposition through intimidation or sheer physical force, interfering with the ability to have free and fair elections, a key part of the democratic process.

Civil control is the authority of a nations political structure to make policy and implementation decisions that can be directed to the military to enact and then oversaw throughout.

As Samuel Adams wrote in 1768, "Even when there is a necessity of the military power, within a land, a wise and prudent people will always have a watchful and jealous eye over it".

[11] Even more forceful are the words of Elbridge Gerry, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, who wrote that "[s]tanding armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican Governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism.

8, one of The Federalist Papers documenting the ideas of some of the Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton expressed concern that maintaining a large standing army would be a dangerous and expensive undertaking.

James Madison, another writer of many of The Federalist Papers,[12] expressed his concern about a standing military in comments before the Constitutional Convention in June 1787: In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate.

Coming from a tradition of legislative superiority in government, many were concerned that the proposed Constitution would place so many limitations on the legislature that it would become impossible for such a body to prevent an executive from starting a war.

Hamilton and Madison thus had two major concerns: (1) the detrimental effect on liberty and democracy of a large standing army and (2) the ability of an unchecked legislature or executive to take the country to war precipitously.

[17] In Mao's theory, the military—which serves both as a symbol of the revolution and an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat—is not merely expected to defer to the direction of the ruling non-uniformed Party members (who today exercise control in the People's Republic of China through the Central Military Commission), but also to actively participate in the revolutionary political campaigns of the Maoist era.

Civilian leaders cannot usually hope to challenge their militaries by means of force, and thus must guard against any potential usurpation of powers through a combination of policies, laws, and the inculcation of the values of civil control in their armed services.

[18] Another exception occurred in the 2020-21 United States election crisis when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley began requiring subordinates to check with him before carrying out orders from President Donald Trump; he also called People's Liberation Army Commander-in-Chief Li Zuocheng to assure him that the United States would not launch a military strike on China and that its federal government would remain stable.

In The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington argued for what he termed "objective civilian control", "focus[ing] on a politically neutral, autonomous, and professional officer corps".

[8] This autonomous professionalism, it is argued, best inculcates an esprit de corps and sense of distinct military corporateness that prevents political interference by sworn servicepersons.

Conversely, the tradition of the citizen-soldier holds that "civilianizing" the military is the best means of preserving the loyalty of the armed forces towards civil authorities, by preventing the development of an independent "caste" of warriors that might see itself as existing fundamentally apart from the rest of society.

[11]In a less egalitarian practice, societies may also blur the line between "civilian" and "military" leadership by making direct appointments of non-professionals (frequently social elites benefitting from patronage or nepotism) to an officer rank.

A more invasive method, most famously practiced in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, involves active monitoring of the officer corps through the appointment of political commissars, posted parallel to the uniformed chain of command and tasked with ensuring that national policies are carried out by the armed forces.

Historically, direct control over military forces deployed for war was hampered by the technological limits of command, control, and communications; national leaders, whether democratically elected or not, had to rely on local commanders to execute the details of a military campaign, or risk centrally-directed orders' obsolescence by the time they reached the front lines.

The remoteness of government from the action allowed professional soldiers to claim military affairs as their own particular sphere of expertise and influence; upon entering a state of war, it was often expected that the generals and field marshals would dictate strategy and tactics, and the civilian leadership would defer to their informed judgments.

Precision-guided munitions and real-time videoconferencing with field commanders now allow the civilian leadership to intervene even at the tactical decision-making level, designating particular targets for destruction or preservation based on political calculations or the counsel of non-uniformed advisors.

Justinian sent a message to Belisarius while besieging Ravenna and when the Gothic garrison in the city was close to being defeated, ordering him to return East to assist with the defense of the empire against Khosrow's invasion of the Roman Empire and instructed him to agree to a peace deal with the Goths under conditions considerably favourable to the Goths, but Belisarius objected to the order and delayed his return.

U.S. President Bill Clinton faced frequent allegations throughout his time in office (particularly after the Battle of Mogadishu) that he was ignoring military goals out of political and media pressure—a phenomenon termed the "CNN effect".

An example of one such set of conditions is the "Weinberger Doctrine", which sought to forestall another U.S. intervention like that which occurred in the Vietnam War (which had proved disastrous for the morale and fighting integrity of the U.S. military) by proposing that the nation should only go to war in matters of "vital national interest", "as a last resort", and, as updated by Weinberger's disciple Colin Powell, with "overwhelming force".

During his tenure, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld raised the ire of the military by attempting to reform its structure away from traditional infantry and toward a lighter, faster, more technologically driven force.