Secure cryptoprocessor

A hardware security module may also be part of a computer (for example an ATM) that operates inside a locked safe to deter theft, substitution, and tampering.

[citation needed] Present TPM implementations focus on providing a tamper-proof boot environment, and persistent and volatile storage encryption.

Security chips for embedded systems are also available that provide the same level of physical protection for keys and other secret material as a smartcard processor or TPM but in a smaller, less complex and less expensive package.

[7] A team at the University of Cambridge reported the successful extraction of secret information from an IBM 4758, using a combination of mathematics, and special-purpose codebreaking hardware.

Normal and recommended practices use the integral access control system to split authority so that no one person could mount the attack.

Additionally, hardware backdoors can undermine security in smartcards and other cryptoprocessors unless investment is made in anti-backdoor design methods.

Or the attacker may apply temperature extremes, excessively high or low clock frequencies or supply voltage that exceeds the specifications in order to induce a fault.

[10] The first single-chip cryptoprocessor design was for copy protection of personal computer software (see US Patent 4,168,396, Sept 18, 1979) and was inspired by Bill Gates's Open Letter to Hobbyists.

[12] He invented a high security module dubbed the "Atalla Box" which encrypted PIN and ATM messages, and protected offline devices with an un-guessable PIN-generating key.

[13] Fearful that Atalla would dominate the market, banks and credit card companies began working on an international standard in the 1970s.

It was consistent and compatible with various switching networks, and was capable of resetting itself electronically to any one of 64,000 irreversible nonlinear algorithms as directed by card data information.