Suppose, that the proposition to be proven is that defendant was the source of a hair found at the crime scene.
These run from jury confusion and computational complexity to the assertion that standard probability theory is not a normatively satisfactory basis for adjudication of rights.
Second, they have said that it is practical to use Bayes' theorem in a limited set of circumstances in litigation (such as integrating genetic match evidence with other evidence), and that assertions that probability theory is inappropriate for judicial determinations are nonsensical or inconsistent.
Some observers believe that in recent years (i) the debate about probabilities has become stagnant, (ii) the protagonists in the probabilities debate have been talking past each other, (iii) not much is happening at the high-theory level, and (iv) the most interesting work is in the empirical study of the efficacy of instructions on Bayes’ theorem in improving jury accuracy.
However, it is possible that this skepticism about the probabilities debate in law rests on observations of the arguments made by familiar protagonists in the legal academy.
In fields outside of law, work on formal theories relating to uncertainty continues unabated.