[1][2][3] In particular, phenomenal consciousness is thought to be a higher-order representation of perceptual or quasi-perceptual contents, such as visual images.
It claims that a mental state is conscious when it is the subject of a higher-order thought (HOT).
Phenomenal consciousness in particular corresponds to certain kinds of mental states (e.g., visual inputs) that are the subjects of HOTs.
Rosenthal excludes the special case in which one learns about one's lower-order states by conscious deduction.
[5]: 366 Similar to a HOT view, this theory proposes that the brain "learns" when there exists a trustworthy lower-level representation.
[5]: 365–66 Scott Sturgeon argues against inner-sense theory on the grounds that it could give rise to disorders in which, e.g., one has a first-order perception of red which mis-triggers a second-order sense of "looks orange".