Intelligence analysis management
[1] During his career in the Office of Strategic Services and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Kent defined many of the parameters of modern analysis and its use.
scholarship drawing upon theories of the sociology of knowledge has criticized Kent's work for being over-positivist and for failing to recognize the role the identity and culture of the analytic unit play in formulating, accepting, and rejecting the hypotheses used to collect and analyze intelligence.
Librarians at the CIA receive large numbers of documents, not counting special source materials, cables, newspapers, press summaries, periodicals, books, and maps.
Since these reports come from scores of different major sources, the daily volume fluctuates and shows a lack of uniformity in format, in reproduction media, in length and quality of presentation, and in security classification.
This becomes important when it results in duplication of effort or, in non-use of reference materials by the researcher laboring under the misimpression that they have all relevant documents in their possession.
Under the active approach, on the other hand, reference analysts would discuss the researcher's problem with them and then proceed, as appropriate, to prepare a bibliography, gather apparently pertinent documents, screen them, check with colleagues in other departments for supplementary materials, make abstracts, have retention copies made of popular items in short supply, initiate a requirement for supplementary field service, or prepare reference aids.
A number of different customers may, for example, make known that it would be very helpful to have a periodic compilation of all finished intelligence reports and estimates for ready reference.
[6] Closer to the internal reference books of the intelligence communities are the Foreign Area Handbooks,[7] originally prepared under contract to the US Army by American University, and later by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress.
[8] [9] The cycle of organizational activity for intelligence purposes extends from the collection of selected information to its direct use in reports prepared for policy makers.
These functions include the identification, recording, organization, retrieval, conversion into more useful forms, synthesis and dissemination of the intellectual content of the information collected.
The ever-mounting volume of information produced and promptly wanted and the high cost of performing these manifold operations are forcing a critical review of current practices in the processing field.
Maps are obvious products, but in infinite variety, including simple outlines onto which specific information can be overlaid, and divisions by political jurisdiction, ethnicities and languages, terrain, etc.
Principally a military term, order of battle refers to the composition of an adversary's organization, including units, key personnel, equipment, and strength.
At a minimum, a current intelligence facility receives raw or minimally processed reports, integrates them with information it has, and, depending on its mission, may support: One function of watch centers, at least those in agencies and commands with collection and surveillance capabilities, is to monitor the availability of sensors, scheduled patrols, etc.
Part of the tactical surprise at the Battle of Pearl Harbor was that patrol aircraft were supposed to be aloft and the early radar station operating, but no watch center verified this—senior officers assumed it was being done.
This was the predecessor of the modern "all-source" center, where tactical reports, cryptanalysis, direction finding, and other functions came together to locate German submarines threatening Allied convoys.
Other units may join conferences when appropriate, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC).
Other countries have similar networks, or sometimes a physical installation to which all affected agencies send representatives, such as the UK Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms "COBRA".
In the case of an aircraft hijacking without terrorist implications, the Federal Aviation Administration operations center may work with the SIOC, or with specific service components such as Coast Guard headquarters.
While some of these contingencies may not immediately seem related to national security, the reality is different, in that a major natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina, will need significant military support.
The US and Russia have exchanged liaison teams in their aerospace warning centers, and there are "hotline" communications between countries that may need to resolve crises, such the HAMMER RICK system between the US and Israel.
Some actions in one's own country or by one's own forces may trigger national-level alerts, such as an accident involving nuclear weapons, a major national disaster, etc.
"I came away from this experience impressed by the quality of DI analysts, but also concerned about their lack of awareness of and access to new information technology and services that could be of critical value to their work.
It is sadly worth noting, however, that CIA analysts still do much better than their FBI counterparts, who have difficulty accessing any external secure networks, or sharing the most sensitive data within their agency.
One indicator of some system shortcomings is simply the fact that an important part of a DI analyst’s tradecraft is building an informal source network.
Rather than simply excluding technologies, their goal should be to develop methods of applying IT that are so user-friendly that DI analysts can operate securely with as few hindrances as possible.
