Technical intelligence
The related term, scientific and technical intelligence, addresses information collected or analyzed about the broad range of foreign science, technology, and weapon systems.
"[1] Scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) is "the (All-source intelligence) analysis and production resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information that covers: S&TI covers not just the equipment, but the process by which it was developed and produced, the production rate of the country or organization making it, and possibly the economic and other priorities given to the project.
The collection phase typically begins when a soldier finds something interesting on a battlefield or a defecting pilot flies an aircraft to a friendly country.
Probably the most expensive and most ambitious was the construction of Hughes Glomar Explorer by the Central Intelligence Agency to obtain the wreckage of Soviet submarine that sunk in the Pacific.
The Air Force Historical Studies Office Web [5] contains an excellent account of the exploitation of Axis aircraft during World War II.
[citation needed] A well studied failure of technical intelligence occurred during the Battle of Osan, the first major engagement of the Korean War, when the American led Task Force Smith was deployed from Japan to confront the Korean People's Army's southward advance, their anti-tank capabilities were six obsolescent M9A1 Bazooka rocket launchers, two M20 recoilless rifles, two 4.2 inch mortars, four 60 mm mortars, and six 105 mm howitzers armed with 1,200 high explosive (HE) rounds.
For example, Army troops used German military telephone wire and medical supplies to aid civilians in France during World War II.
In contrast with tactical technical intelligence, national level science and technology information tends to come less from capture of foreign equipment, and more from HUMINT or creative business relationships.
NCIX named China and Russia among this small number, "just as they have since the CI Community first began systematically tracking foreign technology collection efforts in 1997.
In 2003, Sweden expelled two Russian diplomats over accusations of spying at Ericsson, a major electronics manufacturer whose products include avionics for Swedish Gripen fighter aircraft.
[11] He counters the argument that "lack of direct knowledge of a certain business or its technology has been cited as a significant obstacle to intelligence services engaging in economic espionage.
The NCIX said the easiest techniques can be straightforward, including: Another category starts with agreements of which the hosting government is fully aware, but that may be enforced more or less stringently in specific cases: "Since the mid-1980s, development, production, and marketing of weapon systems has been increasingly internationalized through government-sponsored cooperative development programs and various kinds of industrial linkages, including international subcontracting and teaming arrangements, joint ventures, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
In contrast to the sale of government information, "Ronald Hoffman, a project manager for a company called Science Applications, Inc., made $750,000 by selling complex software programs that were developed under secret contract for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
Related intelligence services that go beyond the mere collection of information and aim to influence events directly, either at a macro-economic or firm level, are understandably more controversial.
He cites the former category, intending to inform government officials, as where the CIA was allegedly supporting the formulation of American trade policy with regard to negotiations concerning audio-visual matters at the GATT.
In a recent article in the Far Eastern Economic Review, FBI officials stated 57 countries are running operations to obtain information out of Silicon Valley.
"The prospect of huge Asian multinational corporations, with their definite but elusive relationship with government, engaging in industrial or economic espionage, may open new debates on when and how intelligence services should intervene in these cases.
For while European states move towards privatization (albeit retaining a "golden share") in many cases there is little sign of a lessening of links between business and government in the high growth communitarian societies of Asia.
A US senator, William Cohen, accused the French of hiding listening devices on Air France flights in order to pick up useful economic information from business travelers.
[17]"In 1993, the CIA warned U.S. aircraft manufacturers to be on the lookout for French spies at the Paris Air Show, and intelligence officials have claimed that France regularly sponsors the theft of information from U.S.
According to de Marenches, Japan examines the global production situation, determines which country can satisfy their high- technology requirement, and then dispatches a collection delegation.
[10][20] According to a Command and General Staff College thesis, Israeli Air Force intelligence tried to steal 14 boxes of corporate data from Recon/Optical, Inc., a company that develops optics and semiconductors used in reconnaissance satellites.
"[19] "In the early 1980s, the companies Hitachi and Fujitsu, and the government agency the Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) were caught stealing corporate secrets from IBM, Cray, and Fairchild Semiconductors.
""[19] "South Korea's equivalent of the CIA, the National Security Planning Agency, places operatives in Korean companies like Hyundai, Samsung, and the Lucky Group.
The bulk of collection was to be done by the KGB and the GRU, with extensive support from the East European intelligence services e.g. in Poland Departament I MSW – Wydział Naukowo-Techniczny.
The act discloses for the first time the functions of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) with regard to the economic and commercial interests of the state.
According to the Act, under the authority of the Secretary of State, the functions of SIS include obtaining and providing information as well as performing "other tasks" relating to the actions or intentions of "persons outside the British Isles".
The USA is particularly upset about the practice engaged in by some countries of not only turning a blind eye to bribery by their own nationals but recognizing these same bribes as tax-deductible business expenses.
The Clinton administration has not been encouraged by progress in lobbying fellow OECD members to pass domestic legislation mirroring America's, or to agree to an enforceable international code condemning the practice.
He claimed that economic spying was justified because European companies had a "national culture" of bribery and were the "principle offenders from the point of view of paying bribes in major international contracts in the world".
