German heavy guns had been unveiled in 1900, but under the influence of Hippolyte Langlois France had concentrated on mobile shrapnel firing Canon de 75 modèle 1897 with a flat trajectory that left crews exposed instead of the high explosive lobbing howitzers.
[2] Michel had presciently identified where the German attack was to come three years later, but he ran afoul of the regular army contempt for reserve officers, and politicians who wanted to recover France's lost provinces.
[8] Explaining the 1870 defeat of France as the result of its drift towards a spirit of defence started to be presented as a way of winning back the lost provinces through overcoming modern long range rifle and artillery fire by will and elan.
[9] A hoax by Edmond Buat (who falsely claimed to have found the German war plan under his seat on a train) was widely accepted, and the French line along the Belgian frontier was denuded by Joffre at the beginning of hostilities.
[5] The huge casualties and lack of gains during the early months of the First World War resulting from crude offensive à outrance attacks on Lorraine created a pessimistic climate of public opinion, while the deaths of so many of the army's best and most determined young officers had lasting deleterious effects.
Another defence of de Grandmaison is his General Staff lectures were taken as applying to the company level which they could hardly have been to such senior officers, he was not of sufficient rank to implement those views, and him being dead made him an ideal scapegoat.