[3] The assessment, signed by the Chief of Army Staff on 9 June 1945, concluded: "It would be beyond our power to win a quick but limited success and we would be committed to a protracted war against heavy odds".
[2] The code name was now reused instead for a second plan, which was a defensive scenario by which the British were to defend against a Soviet drive towards the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean after the withdrawal of the American forces from the Continent.
The hypothetical date for the start of the Allied invasion of Soviet-held Eastern Europe was scheduled for 1 July 1945, four days before the United Kingdom general elections.
[8] The plan was considered by the British Chiefs of Staff Committee as militarily unfeasible due to an anticipated 2.5:1 superiority in divisions of Soviet ground forces within Europe and the Middle East by 1 July, when the conflict was projected to occur.
In response to an instruction by Churchill of 10 June 1945, a follow-up report was written on "what measures would be required to ensure the security of the British Isles in the event of war with Russia in the near future".
[13] Again, the issue of retaining a bridgehead on the continent was discussed, with Dwight D. Eisenhower preferring a withdrawal to the Low Countries, rather than to Italy, because of their proximity to the United Kingdom.