1940 British war cabinet crisis

With the British Expeditionary Force in retreat to Dunkirk and the fall of France seemingly imminent, Halifax believed that the government should explore the possibility of a negotiated peace settlement.

[15] The main problem for Churchill as he became Prime Minister was that he was not the leader of the Conservative Party, and so he was obliged to include Chamberlain in the war cabinet, as Lord President of the Council, and to retain Halifax as Foreign Secretary.

[18][19][20] At a war cabinet meeting on the morning of Friday the 24th, Churchill reported that there were large numbers of French troops in Dunkirk but as yet no British servicemen other than a few specialist units.

The report concluded that resistance to the Wehrmacht would be impossible if they gained a secure foothold in Britain: with the bulk of the army stranded in France, the home-based forces and civil defence would be inadequate.

One was that the United Kingdom could probably resist invasion if the RAF and the Royal Navy remained intact and this became a key point in Churchill's argument, against Halifax, that the country should fight on without negotiation.

Weygand had instructed Blanchard to use his own discretion in supporting the retreat and evacuation as there was no longer any possibility of making a counter-attack to the south, especially as the French First Army had lost all its heavy guns and armoured vehicles.

[44] Churchill remained optimistic and expressed an opinion that there was "a good chance of getting off a considerable proportion of the BEF" and that he would make every endeavour to persuade Reynaud to fight on.

[45][44] Even so, in the interest of being prepared to meet all eventualities, Churchill had asked the Chiefs of Staff (CoS) to consider the situation which would arise if the French did surrender, on the following terms of reference:[46] In the event of France being unable to continue in the war and becoming neutral, with the Germans holding their present position, and the Belgian army being forced to capitulate after assisting the British Expeditionary Force to reach the coast; in the event of terms being offered to Britain which would place her entirely at the mercy of Germany through disarmament, cession of naval bases in the Orkneys, etc; what are the prospects of our continuing the war alone against Germany and probably Italy.

Can the Navy and the Air Force hold out reasonable hopes of preventing serious invasion, and could the forces gathered in this Island cope with raids from the air involving detachments not greater than 10,000 men; it being observed that a prolongation of British resistance might be very dangerous for Germany engaged in holding down the greater part of Europe.Newall reminded the cabinet that the CoS had written British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality (paper no.

[47] There followed a brief discussion among the CoS about the defence of Calais and then, for the first time, Halifax raised the subject of Italian mediation by stating his opinion that "on the broader issue, we (the government) must face the fact that it is not so much now a question of imposing a complete defeat upon Germany but of safeguarding the independence of our own Empire and if possible that of France".

Churchill began by describing his lunchtime meeting with Reynaud, who had stated that the French military situation was desperate but that he had no intention of signing a separate peace treaty with Germany.

[58] Although it is not entirely clear from the minutes, it would seem that the Downing Street session ended now (probably before 3:00 pm) with, first, Halifax and later the other four members going to Admiralty House (a five-minute walk) to see Reynaud.

[62] Churchill replied that he wanted France to hang on but stressed that the United Kingdom must not be forced into the weak position of seeking negotiation before engaging in any serious fighting.

[62] Having listened to Chamberlain, who was still somewhere between himself and Halifax, Churchill suggested that nothing should be decided about future conduct of the war, including any negotiated settlement, until the evacuation of the BEF from Dunkirk was completed.

Halifax was forced to add that since drafting the memorandum he had been advised by the British ambassador in Rome of Mussolini's resentment towards Roosevelt's earlier communication, deriding it as an unwarranted interference in Italy's affairs.

Chamberlain spoke at length about the pros and cons but concluded that the French plan would serve no useful purpose as he expected Italy to join the war in any event so that, as he put it, Mussolini would get a share of the spoils.

[83][84] Also in attendance was Duff Cooper, the Minister of Information, who needed the war cabinet's advice on what to tell the public about the fall of Calais, the Belgian capitulation and the seriousness of the BEF position as they retreated to Dunkirk.

[85] In his diary entry for this day, Colville wrote that the Cabinet was "feverishly" considering the country's ability to continue fighting the war alone given that the fall of France seemed imminent and the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was necessary.

David Owen comments that this was a very different view from that of Cadogan's boss, Halifax, and much closer to that of Chamberlain who, as the minutes show, could see no practical use in an approach to Italy but was worried about upsetting the French.

The war cabinet directed Cooper to make a statement on BBC Radio at 1:00 pm, telling the public that the BEF was fighting its way back to the coast with the full assistance of the RAF and the Royal Navy.

I have only to add that nothing which may happen in this battle can in any way relieve us of our duty to defend the world cause to which we have vowed ourselves; nor should it destroy our confidence in our power to make our way, as on former occasions in our history, through disaster and through grief to the ultimate defeat of our enemies.In response, the acting Leader of the Opposition, Hastings Lees-Smith, thanked him for his statement and pointed out that "we have not yet touched the fringe of the resolution of this country".

[99] As stated in the opening paragraph of the minutes, the meeting was summoned to consider a message received from the French Government again proposing that a direct approach should be made to Italy by France and Great Britain.

Chamberlain agreed with Churchill's diagnosis, but he wanted to keep France in the war as long as possible and urged caution in the British reply to Reynaud.

He suggested, with general approval, that Reynaud should be told the present was not the time to make an approach to Mussolini and that France and Britain would fare better in the future if both continued the struggle.

He advised that, while the war cabinet had been able to watch the situation gradually unfold, the public would sustain a severe shock when they realised the dangerous position of the BEF.

[107] Nevertheless, Halifax still held a powerful position within the Conservative party, even without Chamberlain's support, and Churchill still needed the approval of the outer cabinet for his policy of fighting on, alone if necessary.

[109] Leo Amery, recently appointed Secretary of State for India, wrote that the meeting "left all of us tremendously heartened by Winston's resolution and grip of things".

[111] Hastings outlines Churchill's dilemma faced with the prospect of Halifax, the man widely considered to have majority support in the Conservative Party, quitting his government just at the moment of supreme crisis when Operation Dynamo was barely underway.

He did not remember having ever before heard a gathering of persons occupying high places in political life express themselves so emphatically.Churchill went on to read out a letter which he had received from General Edward Spears in Paris.

Chamberlain read the draft reply which he and Halifax had prepared during the interim, explaining that they were not merely presenting a British point of view as the purpose of the message was to persuade Reynaud that it was in France's interest to go on fighting.