Military Keynesianism

Typical examples of such policies are Nazi Germany, or the United States during and after World War II, during the presidencies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman.

[5] Much of the economy of the Third Reich was oriented towards militarization, especially to prepare for a possible war with the Slavic nations, rather than in the production of consumer goods or towards commercial expansion.

[6] Thus as the prime mover in the first stage of the technique of recovery I lay overwhelming emphasis on the increase of national purchasing power resulting from governmental expenditure which is financed by Loans and not by taxing present incomes.

You, Mr President, having cast off such fetters, are free to engage in the interests of peace and prosperity the technique which hitherto has only been allowed to serve the purposes of war and destruction.While the idea dates back to Keynes, a similar term is often attributed to Barney Frank, and seems to have been first used around funding the F-22 fighter:[3][7] These arguments will come from the very people who denied that the economic recovery plan created any jobs.

It is the view that the government does not create jobs when it funds the building of bridges or important research or retrains workers, but when it builds airplanes that are never going to be used in combat, that is of course economic salvation.The following forms of military Keynesianism may be differentiated: The concept of permanent war economy originated in 1945 with an article by Trotskyist[8] Ed Sard (alias Frank Demby, Walter S. Oakes and T.N.

He argued at the time that the United States would retain the character of a war economy; even in peacetime, US military expenditure would remain large, reducing the percentage of unemployed compared to the 1930s.

[10]” Melman goes on to observe that because this issue “is not unique to the United States[11]” that “It is shared by all states that try to sustain permanent war economies[12].” Melman argues that most of the military production is unnecessary and drains the talents of highly skilled workers due to politicians attempting to create a powerful influx of jobs in their districts, and because of this, most military production is in place to create jobs instead of adding to public safety.

Melman suggests that the large sum of money allocated towards unnecessary military spending would be put to better uses by maintaining or improving domestic infrastructure to have an active positive benefit to society.

For example, in Mosul between 4 and 10 June 2014 a group of between 500 and 600 ISIL troops "were able to seize six divisions' worth of strategic weaponry, all of it US-supplied" from a force with a paper strength of 120,000 men.