Theoretical writings on tactical doctrine in the late 1920s reflect Soviet awareness that motor transport and armoured vehicles would potentially change the conduct of warfare.
Many of the popular Russian Civil War leaders were cavalry officers, which strengthened support for the notion that development of Soviet tactical doctrine should emphasize maneuver and mobility, as was the case in other European armies which were perceived as a future threat to the spread of the Socialist and Communist ideals, such as America and the rest of the capitalist world.
The core premise of the new thinking became a maintenance of the offensive, increase of tempo in the conduct of combat, use of overwhelming firepower, and penetration in depth of enemy territory.
Infantry units received substantial increase in the number of automatic weapons and supporting artillery, and there was a concerted effort to improve leadership qualities of the officer corps, including teaching and encouraging use of initiative.
Stalin severely undermined the improvements made when he instituted the Great Purge of 1936–38, which resulted in the loss of a significant portion of trained officers from the army, including Tukhachevsky.
When World War 2 began with the German invasion of Poland, Stalin instituted a rapid forced expansion of the Red Army, which resulted in even more poorly trained and inexperienced officers being placed in commanding positions they were not ready for.