Signal Intelligence Regiment (KONA)
[4] To quote World War II cryptographic historian, Christos Triantafyllopoulos: "The KONA units did not have the ability to solve complicated Allied cryptosystems.
Commanded by the fanatical Nazi[5] Major Ernst Hertzer, the remains of the regiment consisted of around 700 officers, enlisted men and women who were sent to the abbey at Stift Tepl, that was being used as a Prisoner of War enclosure.
[7] In total, the material created consisted of 31 reports supported with supplements giving information of the makeup and organization of Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung unit 1.
[8] KONA 1 operated in the southern sector of the Eastern Front from June 1941 until May 1945, intercepting and evaluating Red Army, Soviet Air Forces and People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) traffic.
Close Range Signal Intelligence Companies (German: Nachrichten Nahaufklärungskompanie) (abbr.NANAK or NAK) were tasked with intercepting low level traffic.
Major Hertzer, Commanding Officer of KONA 1 stated that the NAA supervisors were generally elderly soldiers, who duty was to gather opinions and make small adjustments in close range signal, intelligence platoons, i.e. NAZ.
[22] These companies (German: Nachrichten Fernaufklaerungs Kompanie) (Abbr:FAK) were different from the Feste, in that they were more concerned to a greater degree with identified traffic.
The Close Range Company (German: Nachrichten Nahaufklaerungs Kompanie) (Abbr:NAK), worked at Army Corps level.
NAA supervisors were generally elderly soldiers, whose duty was to gather opinions and make small adjustments in close range signal intelligence platoons, i.e. NAZ.
Each operator used a report form on which he entered information regarding the time, frequency, call sign, and fragments of intercepted messages, as well as the azimuths obtained.
The operator stated the frequency and call sign of the station to be located and the number of the D/F team, so that the azimuth thus taken could be later confirmed by checking.
For NAK 953, Up to September 1944, it was subordinated to NAA 3 of KONA 1, at the time it was moved to the West, leaving behind its interpreters and cryptanalysts, who continued to serve on the eastern front.
Up to September 1944, NAK 953 was subordinated to NAA 3 of KONA 1, but at that time it was moved to the west, leaving behind only its interpreters and crypt analysts, who continued to serve on the Eastern front.
[38] NAK Benold, named after its commanding officer, was composed of specialists of various kinds who had been drawn from the signal intelligence companies subordinate to KONA 1.
[34] KONA 4 was subordinated to the Commanding Officer Southeast, OB Südost (German: Befehlshaber Suedost), who controlled the German Armies of the Balkans[43] These armies responsibility was one of an occupational force and there KONA 4 added to its normal task of intercepting long range traffic emanating from the Middle East and Africa, i.e. that of monitoring the traffic of the occupied Balkan countries.
[45] The NAAS 4 unit has around 90 men, including interpreters, decoders, cryptanalysts, evaluators, draughtsmen, drivers, telephonist and wireless operators.
When NAA 13 was broken up in November 1944, Feste 2 was subordinated directly to the Senior Commander of Signal Intelligence in the West, Major General William Gimmler.
When KONA 5 was reorganized in the fall of 1944, Feste 3 was combined with the Long Range Signal Intelligence Company: FAK 626, which had been brought from the Eastern Front to form NAA 14.
[68] The original core of NAA 11 was the Long Range Signal Intelligence Platoon designated North (German:Nachrichten Fernaufklaerungszug Nord) (abbr.
One 1 March 1944, FAZ Nord was merged with the Close Range Signal Intelligence Company, NAK 961 to form NAA 11, which increased the units strength from about 80 to 300.
[68] In May 1945, when it was located as Gjøvik, Norway, it was ordered to turn over all its documents and paper to the 20th Mountain Army and to organize a group which would incorporate the experience and knowledge of the unit.
Captain Roessler, Chief Evaluator of KONA 1, and Commanded Officer of the NAAS, observed that: "there were no prescribed rules for evaluation, and this fact, determined by the material dealt with, made the success or failure of the signal intelligence service a personal matter depending on the perspicacity and experience of a few specialists and persons operating in key positions".
Roessler emphasized that in the case of KONA 1, "the interpretation of unknown traffic was...for a long term intelligence point of view, the chief evaluation problem".
The more important conclusions, i.e. those which had tactical value, deduced from traffic relations and content of messages, were collected in the daily Situation Report (German: Lagemeldung).
Further material which served in identification included: The part played by decoded messages in the total success of Signal Intelligence diminished steadily towards the end of the war.
The Chi-number was the serial numbering of all 5-figure messages passing through the hands of the Cipher Officer, starting on the first of January and ending on thirty-first December of the current year.
[82] Direction finding became increasingly important as one of the branches of signal intelligence, as Soviet wireless discipline and cipher security became better and better as the war progressed.
[83] In order to insure the most comprehensive indexes possible, liaison was maintained laterally between the NAAS and KONA 1 and the other regiments on the Eastern front.
A system for exchanging current information, new interpretations, corrections, etc., operated smoothly, the data being passed by telegraph or courier depending upon the urgency of the item in question.
[96] Cryptanalysts relied heavily upon the card indexes (described above) in their work, and also had at hand graphic and statistical presentations of signal letter, arbitrarily, and trigraphic frequencies, and lists of pattern words.
