[5][6] Several instances human rights violations by UN contingents later emerged, including Canada’s Somalia Affair and Italy’s Gallo Commission, which exposed cases of abuse and murder of civilians.

[7][8][9] Overall, UNITAF avoided an armed conflict due to American Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston's strict rules of engagement, aimed at winning the Somali publics confidence—an approach abandoned in the succeeding phase of the UN operation in Somalia.

Faced with a humanitarian disaster in Somalia, exacerbated by a complete breakdown in civil order, the United Nations created the UNOSOM I mission in April 1992.

According to Professor Stephen Hill, Sahnoun recognized this move would undermine his local support, as it was made “without consulting Somali leaders and community elders.” He attempted to delay the deployment but was overruled by UN headquarters.

[16] The large-scale foreign intervention in late 1992 fueled nationalist opposition to international troops, strengthening support for Aidid’s SNA, which condemned the UN’s perceived colonial practices.

[6] John Drysdale, a prominent advisor hired by the UN for the operation warned that Somalis would widely see a military deployment as gumeysi (foreign oppression) if it was perceived to be made without their sanction.

Kittani immediately adopted a confrontational stance ordered the deployments of UNOSOM troops in politically sensitive areas, sparking a security crisis with local Somali factions.

Doctors Without Borders noted that nobody on the ground could seriously claim that such a proportion was not getting through, while staff at various aid agencies operating in Somalia such as World Food Program, the Red Cross and CARE contested that real figures were far lower.

[19] The head of UNOSOM I troops, Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen of the Pakistani army, stated in an interview with British journalists that the amount of aid being looted was being exaggerated in order justify expanding the scope of the operation and that estimates of 80% were completely fabricated.

[21] The Los Angeles Times reported that, shortly before the collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic in 1991, nearly two-thirds of the country had been allocated to American oil giants such as Conoco in deals with the government.

[24] UNITAF has been considered part of a larger state building initiative in Somalia, serving as the military arm to secure the distribution of humanitarian aid.

However, United Nations Security Council Resolution 814 authorizing UNOSOM II was not passed until late March, and the first staff members were not in place and ready to start the transition until April.

Resolution 794 did not specifically identify the U.S. as being responsible for the future task force, but mentioned "the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General's letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment".

[31] President George H. W. Bush responded to this by initiating Operation Restore Hope on 4 December 1992, under which the United States would assume command in accordance with Resolution 794.

In the early hours of 8 December 1992, elements of the 4th Psychological Operations Group attached to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conducted leaflet drops over the capital city of Mogadishu.

[3] Mohamed Farah Aidid, leader of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), initially welcomed the operation, reportedly at the urging of his lieutenant Osman Atto, who had close ties to U.S. embassy officials in Nairobi and the American oil company Conoco.

[37] Peacekeepers often displayed a "casual brutality" in encounters with Somalis, particularly American, Italian and Belgian troops who engaged in torture, murder and sexual violence with relative impunity.

[7] Despite this, UNITAF avoided armed conflict with Somali factions due to the careful rules of engagement created by the head of the operation, US Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston.

[38] United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali determined that the presence of UNITAF troops had a "positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

UN Special Representative Lansana Kouyate of Guinea warned the delegates of the national reconciliation conference that the UN was going to invoke its Chapter VI powers across the entirety of Somalia unless they came to an agreement by 25 March 1993.

[46][48] In addition to this the representative of the UN Secretary-General in Somalia and head of UNOSOM II, retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe, staffed his headquarters with twenty-eight US officers in key positions.