Following the September 1991 Haitian coup d'état, which led to the de facto leadership of military officer Raoul Cédras, the Organization of American States (OAS) began economic sanctions against Haiti.

[1] The following day, Cedras ignored the 15 October deadline to cede his leadership and the United States began a naval blockade of Haiti.

[1] On 16 October, the UNSC authorized military force, including blockades, to implement international sanctions, with more nations joining the effort.

[1] The UNSC established an ultimatum for the military government on 5 May 1994, demanding Cedras to leave Haiti within fifteen days or that he may be removed by force.

[1] Armed intervention was authorized by the 31 July 1994 United Nations Security Council Resolution 940, which granted the "application of all necessary means to restore democracy in Haiti.

[4][5] The operation was directed by Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton, Joint Task Force 120 (JTF-120), provided by Commander, Carrier Group Two.

Senator Sam Nunn and retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell persuaded the leaders of Haiti to step down and allow the elected officials to return to power.

[7] Despite the insistent diplomatic efforts of the American delegation and the insinuation that force would be used if required, negotiations were at a virtual stalemate for the entire time, with General Cédras refusing to concede the legitimacy of the democratic elections.

[8] While allowing Cédras to process the panic-inducing sight, he was informed that while he assumed he was watching a live feed, he was in fact viewing a video captured more than 2 hours before.

They further informed him of the United States' commitment to supporting democracy and that a forced-entry airborne assault on the island nation would, in all likelihood, result in Haiti coming under U.S. control before the next sunrise.

As a result, U.S. forces landing in Haiti saw their objective as severing the junta leadership from the FAd'H without provoking a panic among the rank and file.

Believing that he needed the FAd'H in the short run to avert anarchy, Shelton determined to reform the organization incrementally.

American rules of engagement were very restrictive; even paramilitary FRAPH junta supporters were to be treated as a legitimate political entity and thus not subject to neutralization unless they attacked first.

[10] In one case on 20 September, recently landed U.S. Marines 2/2 in Port-au-Prince stood by while a protesting crowd was violently dispersed by the Haitian police, resulting in a civilian death.

[11] The U.S. Marines who occupied Haiti's second largest city, Cap Haitien, had less restrictive rules; they began immediate foot patrols upon arriving, establishing a strong presence.

[14] The United States Coast Guard played a significant role in the operation, providing command, control and communications services from the USCGC Chase, a 378' high endurance cutter anchored in Port-au-Prince Harbor.

Numerous 210' and 270' medium endurance cutters, 180' buoy tender USCGC Gentian, and 110' patrol boats worked with Navy SEAL gunboats to provide security for forces entering and exiting the twelve-mile exclusion zone and Port-au-Prince Harbor.

The U.S. Army Reserve unit, 458th Transportation Detachment (ATMCT), Belleville, Illinois, was activated and reported to Fort Bragg, North Carolina within 48 hours of notification.

The unit not only participated with the 82nd, during training operations for this mission, before September 1994, but members of 450th "ready team" were on the C-130 aircraft about to parachute into the country.