NLF and PAVN strategy, organization and structure

His land reform measures for example, while not going to the extent urged by American advisers (such as more sharply limiting the number of hectares one farmer could own), in the words of one historian, "did succeed in breaking up the vast estates in the delta, and it changed the landless peasants in the South from the large majority to a minority.

While dependent on US aid, Diem was not afraid to disagree with or stand up to his American sponsors when he felt their demands were unworkable, incurring the enmity of the new US Ambassador Henry Lodge (1963–64) and certain US media figures that kept up a steady drumbeat of negative press, undermining his efforts.

Thousands of regroupees were re-infiltrated south, and a special unit was also set up, the 559th Transport Group, to establish way-stations, trails, and supply caches for the movement of fighting men and material into the zone of conflict.

In other areas, PAVN regulars operated in disguise as "local farmers" - adopting peasant garb like black pajamas and straw hats, and removing manufacturing marks from weapons made in Soviet Bloc countries and shipped to Vietnam.

[3] Dau Tranh was and remains the stated basis of PAVN operations, and was held to spring from the history of Vietnamese resistance and patriotism, the superiority of Marxism–Leninism and the Party, the overwhelming justice of Vietnam's cause, and the support of the world's socialist and progressive forces.

Historian Douglas Pike notes that Dau Tranh was divided into military and political spheres:[23] The strategy of the communist forces generally followed the protracted Revolutionary Warfare model of Mao in China, as diagrammed above.

Unlike Communist forces, the GVN also failed to effectively mobilize a critical mass of its populace behind a nationalist or even an anti-communist narrative on a sustained, large scale basis, although several initiatives were started.

This style involved heavy logistical tails, ponderous organizational structures, dependence on firepower, and frequent roving "sweep" tactics that shortchanged the vital conterinsurgency war for the population base.

By 1973, the Nixon regime faced growing public dissatisfaction, and unremitting pressure by the US Congress, anti-war protesters and segments of the US media, to quickly exit Vietnam, despite promises made of continued aid.

This ineffectiveness was predicted by Hanoi's analyses of weaknesses and contradictions in their enemy's camp (Vo Nguyen Giap, Big Victory, Great Task)[39] An initial policy of gradualism against North Vietnam for example, saw the American President and his Secretary of Defence huddled over maps and charts, planning piecemeal airstrikes on limited targets.

Some American tactics however caused collateral damage and extensive destruction to the countryside, including harassment and interdiction fires (H&I), deployment of heavy artillery and bombs in populated areas, defoliation and the creation of "free-fire" zones.

Adviser postings to the ARVN's regular or local forces for example, were not considered to be a desirable career tracks, and a one-year or six-month tour of duty left scant time to build the intimate knowledge of an area, its politics, and its people necessary to counter the clandestine Communist infrastructure.

Supporters of the "pacification-first" approach argue that more focus on uprooting the local Communist infrastructure, and cleaning up internal problems would have denied the enemy their key population base, reduced the destructiveness of US operations, strengthened the Southern regime, and yielded better overall results.

[70] The "northern-firsters" led by Vo Nguyen Giap and Truong Chinh, argued for a more conservative, protracted approach, which allowed the North to consolidate socialism and build its armed forces while the southern revolutionaries assumed primary responsibility for their liberation.

Prominent "southern-firsters" led by Le Duan and Nguyen Chi Thanh maintained that the Diem regime was tottering on the ropes and quick victory could be assured by an aggressive push that required Main Force confrontations with both the South Vietnamese and the Americans.

Even the costly urban center attacks of the Tet Offensive aided this pattern by (a) undermining pacification efforts as GVN troops from rural areas were diverted to defend the cities, and (b) luring significant US forces out to the periphery where they could be bled.

Tens of thousands of VC and PAVN regulars were required and on several occasions when attempts were made at confrontation in remote areas, such as at the Ia Drang in 1965 and in the 1967 border battles, heavy losses were suffered from US firepower.

Our large-scale operations have attempted to enable the development of a protective shield, by driving the PAVN and the NLF main force units out of South Vietnam—or at least into the remote mountain and jungle areas where they would not pose a threat to the population.

The cadres would then hit their targets with a variety of methods – friendship, casual political discussions, membership in some community organization, sponsorship of some village festival or event, or activism related to some local grievance or issue.

While the Communist presence in the "united Front" against the US/GVN was no secret, VC operatives took pains to screen the full extent of their influence, and stressed patriotism, anti-foreign sentiment, local grievances and other issues that could mobilize support.

In the early stages of the Vietnam War, American officials "discovered that several thousand supposedly government-controlled 'fortified hamlets' were in fact controlled by Viet Cong guerrillas, who 'often used them for supply and rest havens'.

Such "revolutionary government" would set and collect taxes, draft soldiers to fight, impress laborers for construction tasks, administer justice, redistribute land, and coordinate local community events and civic improvements.

VC "Armed Propaganda" squads conducted a systematic campaign of assassination and kidnapping to eliminate competitors, intimidate the populace and disrupt or destroy normal social, political and economic life.

[68] Operating through the PRP personnel, northern cadres and COSVN, and manipulating a variety of front groups, the communist leadership in the North forged a formidable weapon in both the military and propaganda spheres, garnering some support, both in South Vietnam and internationally from sympathetic Westerners.

This elaborate structure often appears ponderous to Western eyes, but it was extremely well adapted to the demands of the war effort, and its built in overlapping, duplication and redundancy made it resilient and able to adjust to defections, captures or deaths among its members.

While the North Vietnamese and their allies made elaborate attempts to camouflage the organizational arrangements that drove the war, it is important to note that both the armed Viet Cong (properly the PLAF), and the regular troops of the PAVN were ultimately one joint force.

[101] Murder, kidnapping, torture and general intimidation were a routine part of NLF/PAVN operations and were calculated to cow the populace, liquidate opponents, erode the morale of the South Vietnamese government employees, and boost tax collection and propaganda efforts.

[104] At other times the Viet Cong eschewed the use of stand-off weapons and directly attacked villages and hamlets with the express intention of killing men, women and children to sow havoc, panic and insecurity.

[107] Massacre at Hue: During Tet for example, Communist forces seemed to have carefully planned for mass killings, with prepared hitlists carried both by the rebelling VC units and local infrastructure operatives.

"[91] Communist forces deployed an extensive and sophisticated intelligence apparatus within South Vietnam, extending from the top echelons of the Southern regime, to village level guerrilla helpers informing on ARVN troop movements.