For the British, the alliance marked the end of a period of "splendid isolation" while allowing for greater focus on protecting India and competing in the Anglo-German naval arms race, as part of a larger strategy to reduce imperial overcommitment and recall the Royal Navy to defend Britain.

Britain grew increasingly distrustful of Japan over its ambitions, and the alliance was ended with the signing of the Four-Power Treaty in 1921 and terminated upon its ratification in 1923.

While this single event was an unstable basis for an alliance, the case was strengthened by the support Britain had given Japan in its drive towards modernisation and their co-operative efforts to put down the Boxer Rebellion.

[7] In the end, the common interest truly fuelling the alliance was opposition to Russian expansion, such as the invasion of Manchuria continuing after the Boxer Rebellion.

[8] This was made clear as early as the 1890s, when the British diplomat Cecil Spring Rice identified that Britain and Japan working in concert was the only way to challenge Russian power in the region.

Britain was cautious about abandoning its policy of "splendid isolation", wary of antagonizing Russia, and unwilling to act on the treaty if Japan were to attack the United States.

There were factions in the Japanese government that still hoped for a compromise with Russia, including the highly powerful political figure Hirobumi Itō, who had served four terms as Prime Minister of Japan.

He was mostly unsuccessful in his visit to Saint Petersburg, and Britain expressed concerns over duplicity on Japan's part, so Hayashi hurriedly re-entered negotiations in 1902.

[10] For Britain, the revision of "Splendid isolation" spurred by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, culminated in the Entente Cordiale (1904) with France and Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.

Fukushima represented Emperor Meiji at the coronation of King Edward VII on 9 August and stayed until September 1902 to work on the details.

[8][15][16] This August 1905 revision additionally called for Japanese support of British interests in India (if Britain faced more than one adversary as stipulated in the original).

[17] As a background, William McKinley won the 1896 U.S. presidential election, succeeding Grover Cleveland, who was a friend of Queen Liliʻuokalani of Hawaii.

Japanese educated in Britain brought new knowledge in science, engineering, and medicine to Japan, such as advances in fluid- and thermo-dynamics,[d] and ophthalmology.

British artists of the time such as James McNeill Whistler, Aubrey Beardsley and Charles Rennie Mackintosh were heavily inspired by Japanese kimono, swords, crafts and architecture.

The clause, which was to be attached to the Covenant of the League of Nations, was compatible with the British stance of equality for all subjects as a principle for maintaining imperial unity; however, there were significant deviations in the stated interests of Britain's dominions, notably Australia, and the British delegation ultimately acceded to imperial opposition and declined to support the clause.

The demands would have drastically increased Japanese influence in China and transformed the Chinese state into a de facto protectorate of Japan.

Dyer, a recipient of the Order of the Rising Sun from Emperor Meiji, had played a role in the expansion of industrialization and engineering in Japan as part of a significant foreign investment.

[34] The demise of the alliance was signaled by the 1921 Imperial Conference, in which British and Dominion leaders convened to determine a unified international policy.

The prevailing hope was for a continuance of the alliance with the Pacific power, which could potentially provide security for British imperial interests in the area.

[36] Meighen, fearing that a conflict could develop between Japan and the United States, demanded the British Empire remove itself from the treaty to avoid being forced into a war between the two nations.

[38] These fears were elevated by the news media in America and Canada, which reported alleged secret anti-American clauses in the treaty, and advised the public to support abrogation.

[41] Empire delegates convinced America to invite several nations to Washington to participate in talks regarding Pacific and Far East policies, specifically naval disarmament.

[42] When Japan came to the Washington Naval Conference, there was significant distrust of Britain in the press and public opinion, even amongst Japanese papers that had previously been more supportive of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

[50][51] One key line of evidence is that Japan-British imperial interests had substantially conflicted before 1921 because Japan was already perceived to be undermining European colonial rule over Asia.

[53] Such tensions were also evident in then-contemporary British political figures, such as Lord Curzon, who stated in 1920 that the main reason for the alliance with the "insidious and unscrupulous" Japanese was to keep them in order, rather than rooted in a friendly relations and diplomatic trust.

[55] These views were also reflected in British papers such as The Times, which even questioned Japanese contributions to the Allied side, and expressed suspicion towards Japan and sympathy with China in the aftermath of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.