The Carthaginian army under Himilco (a member of the Magonid family and kinsman of Hannibal Mago), which had spent the winter and spring in the captured city of Akragas, marched to confront the Greeks at Gela.

The Syracuse government had deposed Daphnaeus, the unsuccessful general of the Greek army at Akragas, with Dionysius, another officer who had been a follower of Hermocrates.

Faced with the defeat and growing discontent in Syracuse, Dionysius made the decision to evacuate Gela to preserve his own power.

Carthage had stayed away from Sicilian affairs for almost 70 years following the defeat at Himera in 480, during which time Greek culture had started to penetrate the Elymian, Sikanian and Sicel cities in Sicily.

Syracuse and Akragas, the leading Greek cities in Sicily did not confront Carthage at that time and the Carthaginian army withdrew with the spoils of war.

The raids of the exiled Syracusan general, Hermocrates, on Punic territory around Motya and Panormus provoked Carthage into sending another army to Sicily in 406 under Hannibal Mago.

Although Syracuse was involved in the Peloponnesian War and with disputes with her neighbors, their government sent an appeal for support to Magna Graecia and mainland Greece once the Carthaginians landed in Sicily.

Dionysius marched to Leontini, held an assembly, and after some stage-managed theatrics, promptly got the people to give him a bodyguard of 600 men, which he increased to 1,000.

[5] Hannibal Mago had brought together an army recruited from Carthaginian citizens, Africa, Spain and Italy, and a fleet of 120 triremes to Sicily.

African heavy infantry fought in close formation, armed with long spears and round shields, wearing helmets and linen cuirasses.

The Libyans, Carthaginian citizens, and the Libyo-Phoenicians provided disciplined, well-trained cavalry equipped with thrusting spears and round shields.

Dionysius brought 30,000 foot and 1,000 horsemen, recruited from Syracuse, allied Sicilian Greek cities, and mercenaries along with 50 triremes to Gela in 405.

Sicels and other native Sicilians also served in the army as hoplites and also supplied peltasts, and a number of Campanians,[15] probably equipped like Samnite or Etruscan warriors,[9] were present as well.

While Dionysius was busy with scheming his way to absolute power, the Carthaginian army had left their winter base at Akragas after destroying the city.

Himilco marched along the coast to Gela, and set up camp near the sea on the west of the city, fortifying it with a trench and palisade.

[17] Apart from his political machinations, Dionysius had managed to make ready an army made of Italian and Sicilian Greeks and mercenaries, numbering at least 30,000 hoplites and 4,000 cavalry and a fleet of 50 triremes,[18] and had marched at a slow pace to Gela.

The Greeks encamped at the mouth of River Gela on the western bank beside the city opposite the Carthaginian camp, close enough to the sea to direct both land and naval operations.

These tactics had almost brought disaster for the Carthaginians at Akragas, but it is likely that Dionysius chose to fight a pitched battle after three weeks because of the mood of his soldiers against a war of attrition.

Dionysius almost pulled one off on the Carthaginains at Gela in 405, but given the difference in circumstances that existed at Cannae and Gela, the battle plan of Hannibal and Dionysius varied; and like Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal Barca found at the Battle of Dertosa in 215, a field commander needs a certain amount of luck along with skilled subordinates and disciplined soldiers to coordinate the complexities of the maneuver correctly.

Dionysius, observing that a seaborne force could attack the camp from the south, where it was open and lightly defended, decided on the following course: The armies and terrain, as well as the circumstances at Cannae, differed greatly from those at Gela and the battle plans of Hannibal and Dionysius reflected this: The plan depended on precise coordination between the three Greek detachments, or risked a defeat in detail for the Greeks.

As things turned out, coordination was horrible: the sea-borne troops under Leptines achieved total surprise and together with the hoplites attacking along the coast broke into the Carthaginian camp.

At this juncture Himilco and the Carthaginian citizens[24] counterattacked, and the Campanians and Iberians also came up, routing the northern prong of the attack, with the loss of another 600 Greeks.

The army may have been unwilling to resume the harassing campaign,[25] and if the Greeks garrisoned in Gela had been bottled up by the Carthaginians, political enemies of Dionysius might take the chance to stage a coup in Syracuse.

As Carthage took no action, Dionysius increased his power and domain in Sicily and finally in 398 launched a war against the Carthaginians by attacking Motya.