Ketuanan Melayu
"[23] The colonial authorities adopted an open "Pro-Malay" policy so the Malays could, in the words of High Commissioner Sir Laurence Guillemard, be equipped "to take their proper place in the administrative and commercial life of these States.
[27] A number of historians have described the pro-Malay policies as designed merely to preserve the position of the colonial authorities, rather than to strengthen that of the Malays; some have characterised the approach as keeping "the races at just the right distance from each other to have the disparate elements of Malaya work in remote harmony".
[42] Nevertheless, the avowed goal of the British remained the same as in 1946: to introduce "a form of common citizenship open to all those, irrespective of race, who regarded Malaya as their real home and as the object of their loyalty.
To the Malays, this indicated that the Chinese had no particular loyalty towards Malaya and justified ketuanan Melayu, heightening similar perceptions caused by the apparent racial dichotomy between those in fierce opposition to the communists and those supporting the MCP.
"[92] Some, such as Syed Jaafar Albar, took Senu's stance further and referred to the Malays, as the Bumiputra, as "masters of the house", whose hospitality was being abused by the bangsa asing (aliens) or orang tumpangan (lodgers) such as Lee.
Both proposed policies on language, education, and Malay rights that were diametrically opposed to those of the government, with the DAP continuing where Lee Kuan Yew had left off with the "Malaysian Malaysia" campaign.
According to some sources, one group of "ultras", comprising Syed Nasir Ismail, Musa Hitam, and Tengku Razaleigh, felt that the power-sharing Constitution had failed, and agreed that the country had to be "returned" to the Malays.
The Minister of Home Affairs, Ismail Abdul Rahman, alleged that "These ultras believe in the wild and fantastic theory of absolute dominion by one race over the other communities, regardless of the Constitution.
Prior to this, the government had, in the words of a local economist, played "administrative, supportive, and regulatory" roles in attempting to address the economic imbalance, but avoided "represent[ing] direct and active efforts in promoting" Malay interests.
The NEP's greater intervention in the economy led some to "equate UMNO's monolithic image as the undisputed champion of Malay supremacy with the party's ability to shore up lucrative business deals.
When the proposed changes were first announced, the British press charged they would "preserve as immutable the feudal system dominating Malay society" by "giving this archaic body of petty constitutional monarchs incredible blocking power".
The censorship of sensitive issues was labelled as paradoxical when contrasted with Tun Abdul Razak's speaking of "the full realization that important matters must no longer be swept under the carpet..."[136] Other critics argued that Article 153 was nothing more than a "paper rice bowl", and in any case, did not even include the orang asli (native people) or aborigines within the scope of its privileges, rendering its rationale somewhat suspect.
Journalist K. Das once claimed Musa had told him "that a young Malaysian politician has to play the race card to the hilt even if there was not a single chauvinistic bone in his body.
Its findings expressed concern over a number of problems, including alleged disrespect of the citizenship of the Malaysian Chinese and the Malay-dominated civil service, claiming the NEP's goal of eradicating identification of race with economic function had been abrogated.
However, some UMNO officials warned non-Malay parties to avoid "playing with fire" by questioning the Malays' special rights and privileges or Hak Keistimewaan Orang Melayu.
Anwar Ibrahim, then Education Minister, refused to yield to protests from the MCA, and stated that the decision was final, despite a previous informal agreement on the issue between the Malay and Chinese communities.
In this context, one MCA politician charged that the government had pursued a "hidden agenda," deflecting public attention from UMNO's crisis with a "deviation in the implementation of the Chinese education policy."
[185] Although the early 1990s saw marked economic growth, commentators suggested that Mahathir's liberal policies had played the key role in his popularity and the Barisan Nasional's landslide 1995 election victory.
However, some in UMNO considered meritocracy too harsh on rural Malay students, disadvantaging them compared to their urban counterparts, and called for the restoration of quotas to avoid an "uneven playing field".
[195] At the 2004 UMNO General Assembly, Deputy Permanent Chairman Badruddin Amiruldin waved a book on 13 May Incident, warning: "Fifty-eight years ago we had an agreement with the other races, in which we permitted them to menumpang [reside temporarily] on this land.
Then Higher Education Minister Shafie Salleh also declared at the assembly that non-Bumiputras would never be permitted to enter the Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), which is Bumiputra-only: "I will not compromise on this matter.
"[191][196] Then at the following year's General Assembly, Education Minister and UMNO Youth head Hishammuddin Hussein brandished the keris while calling for the restoration of the NEP as part of the National Development Policy (NDP) that Mahathir had initiated.
M. Kayveas, the President of the PPP, disagreed: "Every 12 months, the parties go back to one race championing their own causes and, at the end of the day, when the general election comes, we talk about 'Bangsa Malaysia'.
[207][208][209] The following month, a controversy arose after the Asian Strategic and Leadership Institute (ASLI) issued a report calculating Bumiputra-held equity at 45% — a stark difference from the official figure of 18.9%, used by politicians to justify the retention or revival of the NEP.
[213] In the resulting controversy about his remarks, several federal ministers criticised Ghani, with one saying that Bangsa Malaysia "has nothing to do with one race given a pivotal role over others", and another arguing that "It does not impinge on the rights of Bumiputeras or other communities.
Najib, the Deputy Prime Minister, suggested that any effort to define Bangsa Malaysia politically would be fruitless, and as such the debate was unnecessary; he also insisted that "It does not question the special rights of the Malays, our quota or anything of that sort.
[218] In the 2008 general election, BN was returned to power for the first time without its customary 2/3 supermajority in the Dewan Rakyat, meaning it could no longer pass constitutional amendments without the support of opposition parties.
Celebrating the end of his five-year ban from political activity on 15 April 2008, he told reporters: "We are here to counter the massive propaganda campaign by Umno leaders, who are talking on Malay supremacy.
[223] His conditional apology was met with heavy criticism from within UMNO; one media outlet described the reaction as such: "The sentiment among many in the party is that the Chinese and Indians betrayed the BN when they voted for Pakatan Rakyat.
Tensions erupted into a political crisis, which saw the downfall of Mahathir in favour of his Bersatu deputy Muhyiddin Yassin, who became Prime Minister with the support of a number of parties including UMNO and PAS on a pro-ketuanan Melayu platform.
