1963 request for a state of exception in Brazil

Citing the crisis and the threat of internal disturbances as justification, it was based on Congress's resistance to approving the reforms desired by the Executive, as well as the need to assert itself before the opposition.

[1] The military leadership of the government was concerned about the Army's loss of its monopoly of force and the regimentation of illegal weapons by the right wing.

[2] Meanwhile, among the lower ranks of the military there were episodes of insubordination, notably the recent Revolt of the sergeants [pt], which took place in Brasilia on September 12.

[4][5][6] In the same month, the President decreed the suspension of the operation of the Brazilian Institute of Democratic Action (IBAD), an organization that supported opposition candidates and harbored part of the coup plotting already underway against the government.

[11] His statements were supported by Ademar de Barros, governor of São Paulo,[12] who spoke in Guaratinguetá that the government would fall by the end of the year and possibly not even the 1965 elections [pt] would be held.

[13] Carlos Lacerda gave an interview to Julian Hart, correspondent of the Los Angeles Times, who published it in the United States.

Analyzing the Brazilian crisis, Lacerda suggests to the American people to suspend economic aid to Brazil until it returns to the right rhythm.

"[14] Lacerda criticized the "labor agitation," denouncing communist infiltration of the government and the General Workers Command [pt] (CGT).

"[18][16]On September 30 Abelardo Jurema [pt], Minister of Justice, received a copy of the interview, which was discussed at a meeting in Goulart's cabinet.

[21] On the 1st, the Tribuna da Imprensa reported that the First Army was on standby and the government leaders were already discussing federal intervention in Guanabara and São Paulo.

[22] The Correio da Manhã, on the 3rd, noted that the leadership had abandoned the idea of federal intervention for lack of a legal argument and reported the readiness of the Armed Forces.

Minister Jurema's message described the country's crisis scenario:[25][26] The collective manifestations of indiscipline seen in the Military Police of some states, the uprising of graduates and soldiers of the Air Force and Navy in the very capital of the Republic and, more recently, acts contrary to military discipline practiced by corporals and sailors in Guanabara, all contained by the unbreakable spirit of loyalty to the Constitution and the principle of authority of our Armed Forces, are an example of the abnormality of Brazilian life.

For their part, wage demands, which should be routine events in relations between employees and employers, especially in a phase, such as the present one, of renewing collective labor agreements, have become a factor in worsening the political and social crisis and serve as a pretext for the forces of reaction to conspire against democratic legality.

[30] His removal could be popular, as he was accused of corruption and his state had the largest number of industrial workers, the President's political base.

[10] According to Thomas Skidmore the emergency government could acquire an anti-party character, based mainly on military support, and would dismantle political mobilization, especially that of the left.

[35] For Moniz Bandeira, this was not a coup, but "an attitude of force, without transposing the constitutional space, [...] not only for the adoption of defense measures but also for the realization of the basic reforms.

"[27] Most politicians, both civilian and military, thought the proposal was unilateral and the country had no internal unrest to justify the legal device of a state of exception.

[39] In a statement, Miguel Arraes declared that the path "cannot be that of suspending the rights and liberties that the Constitution guarantees to citizens and to the people in general.

The governors, in turn, would not accept the acts of exception,[5] their opposition being expressed by Arraes on the left, Magalhães Pinto from Minas Gerais in the center, and Lacerda and Ademar de Barros on the right.

The Stock Exchange dropped six points and the price of the US dollar rose by 30 cruzeiros, with great demand and forecasts of a greater rise in the following days.

[45] On the 6th, O Estado de S. Paulo reported that on the day of the request, the Nucleus of the Airborne Division had prepared a frustrated attempt against the governor of Guanabara.

Mafra had alleged that Goulart had decreed a state of exception ad referendum by Congress and started a military intervention in Guanabara.

Inside the Nucleus, the officers demanded clarification, and General Pinheiro admitted that the Minister of War had ordered Lacerda's arrest.

[47] According to Jorge Ferreira, the command was plotted "in a mysterious nocturnal meeting at the Laranjeiras Palace, [by] unidentified sectors, with presidential orders," so that the country would dawn with Lacerda arrested "and the state of exception decreed de facto.

"[10] Elio Gaspari attributes the operation to the government's military device and emphasizes the delay caused by the paratroop commanders' refusals to participate.

"[49] General Justino Alves Bastos [pt], commander of the Fourth Army, tried to prevent a rally of thirty thousand peasants who were to come to Recife on the 6th.

[52] Carlos Fico, who calls Lacerda's case "an old and badly told affair," sees what happened at the Palácio das Princesas as the most suspicious military operation at that time.

[57] Its repercussion, together with that of the Revolt of the sergeants, fed the belief of the coup plotters that Goulart intended to take power, and they received adhesions from other military personnel and civilians.