Revolutionary 3rd Army
It emerged on April 2 by the self-proclamation of General Mário Poppe de Figueiredo, in charge of the 3rd Infantry Division in Santa Maria, as commander of the 3rd Army.
The 3rd Army was based in Porto Alegre and commanded by General Ladário Pereira Teles, loyal to the João Goulart government and opposed to the coup.
The commander of the 1st DC, João de Deus Nunes Saraiva, remained legalistic but went to Porto Alegre, while parts of his division joined the coup.
[6][a] In 1961 the 3rd Army ensured João Goulart's inauguration as president when its commander, General José Machado Lopes, participated with his forces in the Legality Campaign in alliance with the governor of Rio Grande do Sul Leonel Brizola.
[11] The importance of the 3rd Army in 1961 and the fact that Rio Grande do Sul was Goulart's home state made it a natural refuge for the president's reaction to a new coup d'état.
[14] The change reflected the nationwide trend in the Army[7] and had as antecedents the conspiratorial activity against Goulart conducted by the Institute of Research and Social Studies (IPES) and, in parallel, by General Olímpio Mourão Filho.
The conspiracy reached the commander of the 6th DI, Adalberto Pereira dos Santos, the governor elected in 1962, Ildo Meneghetti, and even General Galhardo's HQ, although he was not part of it.
[24] According to the government's plan, Galhardo would follow to the command of the Brazilian Army General Staff, in Rio de Janeiro, and Ladário to the 6th DI.
[35] At the time of the coup the region was commanded by General Silvino Castor da Nóbrega, who "if not openly preaching, in a veiled manner defended the President's positions".
[31] General Carlos Luís Guedes, an important conspirator in Minas Gerais, was on March 30 optimistic to learn of Dário's presence in command in Curitiba.
News of the leadership of Magalhães Pinto and the governors Adhemar de Barros of São Paulo and Carlos Lacerda of Guanabara created fear, as the officers did not like these politicians.
[33][46] Three detachments (Beta, Lages, and Litoral) were organized to march towards Rio Grande do Sul, reinforced on the 2nd by Tactical Grouping 4, coming from São Paulo.
[31] According to Ruy de Paula Couto, then colonel in charge of the 3rd Regiment of 105 mm Obuses (3rd RO 105) and the Divisionary Artillery, Poppe was not against the movement, but was inhibited by his feeling of gratitude to the Minister of War.
[50] Both Couto and Colonel Ramão Menna Barreto, chief of staff of the division,[b] describe the general as undecided, while Poppe does not mention doubt in his memoirs.
Besides difficulties with commanders, in the 3rd Light Combat Car Battalion (BCCL) "there was much uneasiness in the first days," and in the 7th RI, the arrest of a lieutenant and transfer of six sergeants.
Since his inauguration in 1963, Poppe de Figueiredo monitored the Gauchos Railroad Workers Union (UFG), nicknamed "Soviete," and its leader Balthazar Mello.
At 03:30 of day 1 he telephoned Santa Maria communicating his intention not to hand over his command and urging General Poppe to join the coup; according to the official report of the 3rd DI, his answer was "the heart tells me to support you, but reason doesn't allow me to do so".
[70] On the other hand, for Major Renato Moreira, of the 3rd Army's General Staff, Colonel Jarbas faced a lot of resistance from his subordinates, and most were pro-Adalberto.
[2] The Cruz Alta garrison was trusted by Adalberto,[72] and he found support from the commanders of the 17th RI, AD/6, and 2nd/6th RA 75 AR; however, rumors circulated of a sergeants' conspiracy against him.
[71] According to Captain Luiz Gonzaga Schroeder Lessa, company commander of the 19th RI, the regiment offered refuge to General Adalberto, but after he left Porto Alegre, his whereabouts were unknown.
The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion, led by Captain Attila Rohrsetzer, moved in advance to the Morro do Espelho (Mirror Hill), behind the barracks, and remained there without participating in the crisis.
A group led by Sergeant Bernardino Saraiva[f] remained rulers and entrenched in a corner of the barracks until they were advised of the overthrow of the government and disappearance of the president.
[87] The 2nd, according to Hélio Lourenço Ceratti, sent there by the Army Command and General Staff School, remained legalistic even 40 days after the coup; Serafim Vargas, Getúlio's brother, was influential in the regiment, the commander of the garrison and of the 2nd 75 Horse Artillery Group, Colonel Hélio Nunes, believed in Goulart's return to the presidency, and only the city's Marine Corps had joined the coup.
As for the 4th RC, he describes its commander, Colonel Álvaro Lúcio de Arêas, as opposed to the speech of the ruling general Oromar Osório (Saraiva's predecessor), but obedient.
[54] An account of the situation in Bagé is given by Lélio Gonçalves Rodrigues da Silva, a captain in the 3rd 75mm Cavalry Artillery Regiment (3º RA 75 Cav).
On one side were the general and the colonels of the units - Osmar Mendes Paixão Cortes (3rd RA 75 Cav), Washington Bandeira (12th RC), and Jaci Brum Braga (3rd Mechanized Reconnaissance Regiment).
Among them was Captain João Carlos Rotta, for whom Colonel Brito was a Marxist, was about to get an appointment to general, and was engaged to the extreme in the defense of his stretch of the Santa Catarina border.
[116] The 1st Railway Battalion, from Bento Gonçalves, and the 3rd Automatic Anti-aircraft Cannon Group, from Caxias do Sul, joined the coup at 01:00 and 01:45 in the morning of the 2nd, placing themselves at the disposal of the 3rd DI.
[j] According to Lieutenant Colonel Agostini, the idea circulated in Santa Maria that morning and sought to coordinate the rebellious forces in the state and prevent a hasty and isolated onslaught by any of them.
[122] Majors Chagas and Campedelli cite the idea's presence in Uruguaiana, aiming to "neutralize Ladário's determinations" and prevent a more modern general from taking over before Poppe.
