[1] As such, the ROC consisting of Taiwan and other islands under its control exercise full autonomy in its internal governance and already conducts official diplomatic relations with and is recognized by 12 member states of the United Nations and the Holy See.

[3] The Taiwan independence movement is supported by the DPP and the broader Pan-Green Coalition given the threat posed to its liberal democratic system and human rights.

The government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) oppose Taiwanese independence since they believe that Taiwan and mainland China comprise two portions of a single country's territory and regards any moves (retaining political autonomy of the ROC or the radical move of declaring formal independence) as separatism that violate the constitution of the PRC and international law given its own interpretation of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758.

The government of the PRC has officially maintained the position of peaceful unification of Taiwan but does not rule out using military force, if necessary, to "reunify" the island should formal independence be declared.

This was possible mainly through the connections between Sukarno and the Provisional Government's Southeast Asian liaison, Chen Chih-hsiung, who had assisted in Indonesia's local resistance movements against Japanese rule.

During that time, many advocates of independence and other dissidents fled overseas, and carried out their advocacy work there, notably in Japan and the United States.

[citation needed] As the electoral success of the DPP, and later, the DPP-led Pan-Green Coalition grew in recent years, the Taiwan independence movement shifted focus to identity politics by proposing many plans involving symbolism and social engineering.

The interpretation of historical events such as the February 28 Incident, the use of broadcast language and mother tongue education in schools, the official name and flag of the ROC, slogans in the army, orientation of maps all have been issues of concern to the present-day Taiwan independence movement.

[16] In February 2007, President Chen Shui-bian initiated changes to names of state-owned enterprises, and the nation's embassies and overseas representative offices.

The Pan-Blue camp voiced its opposition to the changes and the former KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou said that it would generate diplomatic troubles and cause cross-strait tensions.

As the Pan-Blue camp held only a slim parliamentary majority throughout the administration of President Chen, the Government's motion to change the law to this effect were blocked by the opposition.

Later, U.S. Department of State spokesman Sean McCormack said that the U.S. does not support administrative steps that would appear to change the status-quo by either Taipei or Beijing as threats to regional security.

Lee said the most important goals are to improve the people's livelihoods, build national consciousness, make a formal name change and draft a new constitution that reflects the present reality so that Taiwan can officially identify itself as a country.

During the campaign period, Lai asserted Taiwanese sovereignty, but said a formal declaration of independence would be unnecessary and favored maintaining the status quo.

Whereas, the latter coalition aims to improve relations with the Beijing government (PRC) — which it refers to as "mainland China" — and eventually "reunify" at some point.

It also cites the Potsdam Declaration and Cairo Communique as confirming Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan; inasmuch as the PRC is the internationally-recognized "China", it thus posits that it is the lawful sovereign power on the island.

The more moderate Huadu faction, mainly located in the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, posits Taiwan and its outlying islands are already a sovereign state under the name "Republic of China", making a formal declaration of independence unnecessary.

Reportedly, the local government of Kinmen County supports stronger business and cultural ties with mainland China, similarly to the Kuomintang, and views itself as an important proxy (representative) or nexus (focal point) for improving Cross-Strait relations (that is, in the favour of Chinese unification).

This same camp also believes that the PRC has only "allowed" the ROC to continue controlling Kinmen and Matsu in order to "tether" Taiwan to mainland China.

In a hypothetical scenario where Kinmen and Matsu are abandoned by the Taiwanese state, they would likely be "ceded" to the People's Republic of China via a peace treaty, officially ending the Chinese Civil War.

Additionally, Quemoy and Matsu experienced a unique history for several years as military outposts of the ROC, further separating the islands from Taiwan in terms of culture.

On 25 October 2004, in Beijing, the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Taiwan is "not sovereign," provoking strong comments from both the Pan-Green and Pan-Blue coalitions – but for very different reasons.

Historically, this was the view of such pro-independence groups as the Tangwai movement (which later grew into the Democratic Progressive Party) who argued that the ROC under the Kuomintang had been a "foreign regime" forcibly imposed on Taiwan.

[58] Although previously no major political faction adopted this pro-status quo viewpoint, because it is a "compromise" in face of PRC threats and American warnings against a unilateral declaration of independence, the DPP combined it with their traditional belief to form their latest official policy.

[59] Most Taiwanese and political parties of the ROC support the status quo, and recognize that this is de facto independence through sovereign self-rule.

Others propose a broader and more flexible definition suggesting that both mainland China and Taiwan are parts that form one cultural and geographic entity, although divided politically as a vestige of the Chinese Civil War.

[61] The PRC considers itself the sole legitimate government of all China, and the ROC to be a defunct entity replaced in the Communist revolution that succeeded in 1949.

Such a name change is met with even more disapproval since it rejects Taiwan as part of the greater China entity (as one side of a still-unresolved Chinese civil war).

[64] In 2024, the Chinese government issued a directive to the courts stating that "diehard" independence supporters could be tried in absentia with capital punishment imposed.

In a Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation poll conducted in June 2020, 54% of respondents supported de jure independence for Taiwan, 23.4% preferred maintaining the status quo, 12.5% favored unification with China, and 10% did not hold any particular view on the matter.