Although Orthodox Christianity is common among ethnically distinct South Ossetians and Abkhaz people, fierce conflicts arose between the central government in Tbilisi and these autonomous entities.
[10] In 1918, conflict began between the landless Ossetian peasants living in Shida Kartli, who were affected by Bolshevism and demanded ownership of the lands they worked, and the Menshevik government backed ethnic Georgian nobility, who were legal owners.
[24] Historians such as Stephen F. Jones, Emil Souleimanov and Arsène Saparov believe that the Bolsheviks awarded this autonomy to the Ossetians in exchange for their help against the Democratic Republic of Georgia,[16][25][26][27][28][29] since this area had never been a separate entity prior to the Russian invasion.
[60] By June 1992, the possibility of a full-scale war between Russia and Georgia increased as bombing of Georgian capital Tbilisi in support of South Ossetian separatists was promised by Russian authorities.
Although the Soviets repeatedly refused to grant Abkhazia separation from Georgia, they did give the Abkhaz enlarged autonomy and financial donations to improve their infrastructure.
[100][101] In August 1992, war broke out when the National Guard of Georgia entered Abkhazia to free captive Georgian officials,[77][102][94] and to reopen the railway line.
Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgia's leader, did not need another war soon after South Ossetia, but was reluctant to condemn the national guard's commander, Tengiz Kitovani, who allegedly led the incursion into Sukhumi unauthorized.
Rule over Transcaucasia, according to Swedish academic Svante Cornell, would allow Russia to manage Western involvement in Central Asia, an area of geopolitical importance.
[128] Russia saw the Black Sea coast and being adjacent to Turkey as invaluable strategic attributes of Georgia and regards the Turkish influence as a risk to its interests in the Caucasus.
[141] During the Georgian Civil War in late 1993, Russia hinted that in addition to admission of the Russian military bases, Georgia's accession to the Commonwealth of Independent States would be a solution to the issues of Tbilisi.
[158] In March 2006, the Russian Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing banned the import of the Georgian wines into Russia, which was seen as politically motivated by Georgia.
Accounts Chamber of Russia found embezzlement of budget funds at Russian Academy of Arts headed by Georgian sculptor Zurab Tsereteli.
[166] According to Kommersant, the 2006 incident involving the exile of the GRU officers provoked a "large-scale confrontation between the Russian Federation and Georgia, which led to war after two years.
Although the Georgian government wanted to achieve settlement through non-military means, it also observed that Russian support of Ossetian separatists undermined the peace process.
"[203][204] In late July 2006, Georgia sent security forces to the Kodori Valley region of Abkhazia, when a local militia leader rebelled against Georgian authorities.
[49][205] In August 2006, ataman of Don Cossacks Nikolay Kozitsyn promised Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh to send up to 15 thousand military volunteers to help Abkhazia.
[211][212] According to observers' opinion, after Sanakoyev started to compete with Kokoity in South Ossetia, the latter began escalating tensions in the region to provoke the conflict in order draw Russia in.
[223] After the incident, Abkhaz president Bagapsh prematurely left the international investment forum in Sochi chaired by Vladimir Putin and returned to Sukhumi.
[225][226][227] Permanent Representative of Russia to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin said that the Georgian forces had attacked the Abkhaz-controlled territory and killed two Russian instructors at the anti-terrorist training center.
[231][232] Georgian foreign minister Gela Bezhuashvili stated that Georgia had not officially approved the CIS decision on appointing Chaban in early October.
[236] Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza said: "This is an incident that sways all attempts to resolve the Abkhaz conflict in the wrong direction.
[197] Russian journalist Semyon Novoprudsky has suggested that the war in August 2008 would not have happened if Russia had forced the Kokoity regime to negotiate with Georgia's central government instead of arming it.
NYT also cited a meeting in Brussels in 2008 where Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister had told western diplomats, among them Condoleezza Rice, that Kosovo's recognition would serve as a precedent for South Ossetia and other separatists.
[266] According to the Austin, Texas based intelligence company Stratfor, the support for Kosovos's secession from Serbia by Europe and the United States contributed to Russia's decision to move into South Ossetia in August 2008.
According to Stratfor, the cornerstone of European security since World War II was inviolability of state borders; however, this was transgressed in the case of Kosovo, thus setting a precedent for independence of Russia's regions.
[287] According to the 2007 report of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Georgia had the highest average growth rate of military spending in the world.
[296] During the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, American president George W. Bush campaigned for offering a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine.
[315] As Moscow-based military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer contended, countries such as Poland, the Baltic states, and Georgia all sought to join NATO "to have a guarantee against the Russians."
"[319] Russian president Vladimir Putin wanted Russia to become global superpower again, and challenged the unipolar post-Cold War order and the United States in his 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference.
[328][329] Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Yuri Baluyevsky said on 11 April 2008 that Russia would carry out "steps of a different nature" in addition to military action to block NATO membership of former Soviet republics.